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Theory and Evidence 
 
Summary 
This paper analyzes the constitutional determinants of cost reimbursement rules. In 
order to design the optimal incentive schemes, a possibly partisan planner will take into 
account the market cost structure, the institutional design of the supervision hierarchical 
structure and its technology. I employ electricity data from the U.S. electric power 
market to test the model’s predictions. The evidence shows that reforms from low 
powered incentive scheme (COS) to high powered one (PBR) are linked to high cost 
industries, the presence of elected supervisors, high inter-party platform distance and 
large (slim) majority when the reformer is Republican (Democratic). Moreover, there is 
some evidence in the data that performance-based regulation lowers regulated prices. 
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1.  Introduction 
A major task of economics is to explain the pattern of government intervention in 
industries that is to say industrial policy. An idealized, but illuminating, view of 
regulatory  institutions  is  that  they  result  from  a  broadly  defined  constitution 
drafted by some benevolent “founders” behind a veil of ignorance.
1 This “public 
interest” research program derives policies able to correct market failures such as 
monopoly pricing. In the last twenty years this paradigm has been substantially 
improved by explicitly considering informational asymmetries. Industrial policy 
can  be  thought  as  resulting  from  the  optimal  trade-off  between  efficiency 
enhancement and rent extraction and, indeed, in regulating a natural monopoly, 
the  planner  will  select  optimal  cost-reimbursement  rules,  which  arbitrate 
differently between cost reducement effort (i.e.: moral hazard with risk neutral 
firm) and informational rents (i.e.: adverse selection). Price-cap favors efficiency, 
while  cost-plus  regulation  (COS)  favors  rent  extraction.  However,  the  public 
interest approach completely fails in taking into consideration both the watchdog 
role of consumers’ (i.e.: residential and industrial) interest groups and the delicate 
set of controls on bureaucrats and politicians. Indeed, judges have discretionary 
power  and  compete  with  executive  branches  and  regulators  in  filling  in 
unforeseen  contingencies  (see  Shapiro  [1986],  Spiller  and  Tiller  [1999]  and 
                                                 
1 These social “planners” must delegate actual social choices to other agents (i.e., “public decision 
makers”) and they possibly design a set of institutions or rules of the game inducing these public 
decision makers to behave as if their respective assessments of welfare coincided.   3 
Guerriero [2006 a]). Moreover, politicians may favor special interest groups (see 
the Chicago tradition in Peltzman [1976] and Becker [1985]) leaving conspicuous 
rents  to  the  officials  involved  in  regulation  (see  Niskanen [1971]  and Wilson 
[1980]). The recent New Theory of Regulation approach has tried to overcome 
such an inconsistency, employing both the classical principal-agent model and the 
growing political economy literature. Two are the main merits of this program: 1. 
the explicit design of the political system details and of the positive forces driving 
public intervention; 2. the crucial role entrusted to private information in giving 
rent seeking incentives to regulated firms’ interest group and signal extraction 
foundations  to  the  hierarchical  structure  of  real  world  regulatory  institutions. 
When explicit contracts on observable efforts or performances are available for 
supervisors, the low type quantity-effort allocation is distorted even more to take 
into account the possible capture and the institutional design of the supervision 
hierarchy (Laffont and Tirole [1993] and Laffont and Martimort [1999]), and the 
planner’s partisan interests (Laffont [1996] and [2000]). In such a collusion-proof 
equilibrium (i.e. in which capture does not prevail), costly incentive payments are 
given to non-benevolent regulators for a value equal to the maximum expected 
collusion offer, which is the firm’s expected stake (i.e. high type rent). However 
this  set  up  basically  fails  in  capturing  real  world  institutions.  Regulators  and 
judges are implicitly motivated by simple election-appointment rules. Moreover 
the review processes’ structure makes difficult to swallow the hypothesis that the 
real role of these officials is one of decision making. Only recently, Guerriero 
[2006,  a]  has  given  a  first  complete  and  realistic  description  of  this  complex 
agency structure. A hierarchical rate review process makes crucial the generosity 
of settlement if judges are interested in leaving a legacy of correctness (“legacy   4 
effect”). This is more likely when regulators are not willing to exert costly effort 
because  they  are  concerned  with  obtaining  job  offers  from  the  industry  (i.e.: 
“revolving door effect”); election magnifies these incentives. A possibly partisan 
(i.e., interested in the long run profitability of the industry) planner will take into 
consideration  the  effectiveness  of  the  signal  extraction  technology  and  the 
accountability  power  of  different  selection  rules  in  designing  the  regulatory 
institutions.  This paper brings two main contributions: 1. It broadens the scope of 
the Guerriero [2006 a]’s model to the optimal selection of incentive schemes; 2. It 
empirically evaluates the merit of this new cost-reimbursement selection theory 
facing it with electricity data. My focus is the economics of regulation but the 
idea is wider and applies to a rich set of market, fiscal and monetary institutions. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly illustrates 
the institutions of the US  electric power market.  Next, Section 3 explains the 
model  clarifying  the  efficiency  driven  and  strategic  determinants  of  incentive 
schemes. Section 4 tests this theory, taking into consideration the introduction of 
performance based regulations (PBR) in the US electricity market during the 80s 
and  90s;  besides,  an  analysis  of  the  effects  of  these  reforms  on  the  sector-
regulated prices is provided. Section 5 discusses the significance of the paper’s 
findings and proposes an agenda for future research. Tables, proofs and a detailed 
description of the data are contained in the Appendix. 
 
2. Institutions 
Investor-owned  electric  utilities  (IOUs)  account  for  over  three-fourths  of  the 
electricity sales and revenues of the U. S. electric power market. Jurisdiction over   5 
both interstate transmission and wholesale transactions lies inside a federal body 
(FERC); retail services are regulated by state public utility commissions (PUCs), 
which deal with several utilities (i.e., natural gas, telecommunications, water and 
wastewater, insurance, trucking and railroad) and perform a broad range of tasks 
(e.g. they suggest lines of conduct on services provision, avoid by-passing by non 
regulated utilities, they rule on environmental issues and so forth) among which 
the most important is the regulation of prices.
2 Regulated utilities are not allowed 
to  receive  governmental  subsides  and  their  revenue  must  cover  their  cost 
(including managerial rewards). IOUs usually charge a two-part tariff,
3 triggering 
rate reviews in response to rising costs (Joskow, [1974]). Even if a docket can be 
entrusted directly to a commissioner or to an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ), 
almost all the files are evaluated within formal meetings open to all the interested 
parties (firms, ratepayers, lawyers of the Attorney General’s Office and so forth). 
In the first instance, commissioners sit on the bench during sessions and consumer 
advocates
4 represent ratepayers. If the proposed filing is not approved, a formal 
quasi-judicial hearing, presided by one or more ALJs, is opened. Next, the quasi-
judicial  tribunal  takes  a  qualified  majority  enforceable  judgment.  PUCs  may 
review the case, provided that the onus of injustice and illegality of the decision 
                                                 
2 Here I follow the descriptions contained in the 1992 and 1997 Sunset Review of the Colorado 
PUC and on the Washington Utilities and Transportation Commission (WUTC) official website.  
3 As Joskow and Schmalensee [1986] suggest the fixed premium paid by consumer turns out to 
assume the some role of the governmental transfer typical of the regulation-procurement literature. 
As a consequence, I will replace the economic shadow cost of public funds with the marginal 
deadweight loss associated with an increase in the fixed premium. 
4 Consumer advocates are state funded independent bodies established during the 70s and 80s in 
the face of steeply rising rates in order to allow even residential users to proceed before PUCs.    6 
lies on the firm. Finally, utilities can also appeal to High Courts on formal issues. 
These two last appeal levels are rarely granted. Within the hearings, the role of 
commissioners  and  ALJs  is  one  of  supervision:  they  examine  witnesses  and 
experts, receive the evidence and interpret precedents and regulations. The final 
motion to be approved is proposed by the PUC’s staff. During the process, this 
body is divided in a “trial” and in an “advisory” team. While the latter reviews the 
case formulating a staff position in all equated to the one of any other interested 
party; the former advices regulators and judges on technical and policy issues, 
proposing  de  facto  the  motion.  The  complete  record  of  the  hearings  and  the 
participation of all parties assure that the PUC’s staff uses only “hard” evidence. 
This is a by-product of the “adversary” scope of the hearings: no evidence can be 
denied once the precedent is individuated. Thus, the design of incentive schemes 
can be modeled through the following version of the Guerriero [2006, a]’s model. 
 
3. Theory 
The regulated firm produces a variable scale product q and charges a two part 
tariff A + pq for q > 0, where A and p are positive. It can refuse to produce if the 
contract offered by the principal does not guarantee a minimum level of expected 
utility, that I will normalize at a reservation level of 0. Both the firm and the 
supervisors are risk neutral with respect to income. Total cost is C = (β – a)q + υ 
and a represents the manager’s effort, while β is an inefficiency parameter, which 
turns out to be equal toβ  with probability v and toβ  with probability 1 – v; with 
∆β ≡ β  –β . Assuming that the fixed cost is known, and normalizing it at zero (υ 
= 0) it is possible to denote marginal cost as c ≡ β – a. Regulation is subject to   7 
both adverse selection (as captured by β) and moral hazard (as captured by a). Let 
assume that effort remains strictly positive over the relevant range of equilibrium 
production.  If  the  manager  exerts  effort  level  a,  she  decreases  the  monetary 
marginal cost of output by a, and incurs in a disutility (in monetary units) of ψ(a). 
This disutility is increasing and convex in a (i.e.: ψ ′>0; ψ ′′>0); moreover the 
following hold: ψ(0) = 0, lima →β ψ(a) = + ∞ and ψ ′′′>0.
5 All consumers have the 
same preferences; thus, the demand is the one of a representative consumer with 
gross consumer surplus given by S(⋅). The inverse and regular demand functions 
and the firm’s revenue are given by p = P(q) = S ′(q), q = D(p), R(q) = P(q)q + A 
respectively. Consumers choose q as to maximize net surplus S(⋅) – A – pq and A 
is chosen optimally so as to make her indifferent between buying and not buying 
the good i.e., A ≡ S(q) – P(q)q. Firm’s revenues must cover both average costs 
and managerial compensation t; moreover the firm can refuse to produce if a level 
of  expected  utility  U  weakly  greater  than  the  reservation  level  of  0  is  not 
guaranteed. As a result, I have that A + (p – c)q(p) ≥ t and U = t – ψ(a) ≥ 0.   
Let denote the social surplus obtained by the production of q as V(q) with V(0) = 
0, V ′ > 0, and V ′′< 0. V(q) is the sum of consumers’ net surplus plus the firm’s 
revenue evaluated at the shadow price of managerial reward. V(q) rewrites as: 
V(q) = (S(q) – R(q)) + (1+λ)R(q) = S(q) +λR(q) = (1+λ)S(q).                                   
The planner’s objective function, labeled with subscript P, is: 
P W  = S(q(p)) – A – pq(p) + (1+λ) [A + (p – c) q(p) – t] + U =  
         = V(q) – (1+λ)[(β – a)q+ψ(a)] – λU                                                            (1) 
                                                 
5 This is a sufficient condition for the regulator’s optimization programs to be concave and for the 
optimal incentive schemes to be deterministic.   8 
Here, 1 + λ can be interpreted as the shadow price of the firm’s budget constraint; 
note that, in contrast to the program with governmental transfers, λ depends on 
both c and t. Under complete information,
6  the planner implements the first best 
allocation leaving no rent to the firm with a simple “fixed price” (or a cost target) 
contract (see Appendix 6.1 for details). Instead, under asymmetric information, 
the planner observes only total cost and output
7 and not a: as a result, β is now 
private information of the firm. Label equilibrium rewards, outputs, average and 
marginal costs and utilities for the two types as:  ( ) ( ) { } , , , , , , , , , , , . t q C c U a t q C c U a  
A contract based on the observables t and C specifies a reward-cost pair for each 
type. As usual, the program envisions a solution with binding low (inefficient) 
type’s individual rationality and high type’s incentive compatibility constraints: 
( ) 0 U t c ψ β = − − =                                                                                     (IR_L) 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) U t c U c c a ψ β ψ β ψ β = − − = + − − − = Φ                                 (IC_H) 
where Φ(·) is an increasing function defined as  ( ) ( ) ( ) a a a ψ ψ β Φ ≡ − − ∆ .
8 Such 
a solution entails an efficient level of effort and a positive informational rent U  
for the high type and under-effort and no rent for the low type. Now suppose that 
the planner can relax the informational asymmetry by employing a hierarchy of 
                                                 
6 Realized costs, outputs and prices are verifiable. The planner knows β and acts as a Stackelberg 
leader making take-or-live it offers on the observable a. 
7 With a linear technology, the planner observes average costs, which are equal to marginal cost. 
With know fixed cost υ, she observes (C – υ)/q = β – a and the analysis goes on unchanged. 
8 Incentive compatibility prescribes that the contract designed for typeβ  (β ) is the one preferred 
by type β  (β ) in the menu of managerial rewards-cost pairs. This amounts to say that: 
( ) ( ) t c t c ψ β ψ β − − ≥ − −      (IC_H)     and       ( ) ( ) t c t c ψ β ψ β − − ≥ − −       (IC_L).   9 
two  supervisors  (i.e.  a  regulator  and  a  judge)  designed  exactly  as  the  market 
described in the institutional analysis. The question is the following: is it possible 
to assess the ex post normative qualities of the incentive schemes selected by a 
possibly partisan planner? As the following theory will make clear, the success of 
the regulatory regime design is sensible to efficiency and political dimensions. I 
will  first  treat  the  former  underlining  the  main  similarity  with  the  model  of 
Laffont  and  Tirole  [1993],  leaving  the  positive  side  of  the  issue  to  the  next 
subsection. There I will compare the results with the seminal work of Laffont 
[1996]. The following analysis strictly tracks the approach of Guerriero [2006, a]. 
Supervisors  can,  exerting  costly  effort,  tailor  the  supervision  activity  to  the 
specific docket (i.e., they choose the number and quality of the experts, the firms’ 
official papers to be examined and so forth). The equilibrium level of effort and 
the supervisors’ random ability (e.g., ability to examine experts given precedents 
and prevailing regulations) determine the precision of the planner’s signal. As 
explained above, the report is effectively delivered by the PUC’s staff, so I simply 
assume that the planner has directly at her disposal this benevolent information 
device.
9 Moreover, given that in our market PUCs’ rules and conducts prohibit 
communication between supervisors, no side contract is allowed between these 
players. Once one of the two docket’s filing steps is set up, the planner receives a 
signal σ = {β ;φ } about the cost structure with precision ξ, determined by the 
supervisors’ activity.  This signal can only inform  aboutβ . The information is 
hard, i.e. it is verifiable (in the sense that every interested party can convince 
                                                 
9 Note that, besides the constraints imposed by the adversary process structure, explicit incentives 
can be designed for the staff members, who are not implicitly motivated by an appointment rule.   10 
himself that the signal corresponds to the true state of the world). If β =  β  with 
probability ξ the planner sees σ =β  and implements the complete information 
contract and with probability 1 – ξ she observes σ =φ . If β =β , then σ =  φ  
always.
10 When σ =  φ , the planner is uninformed, and she updates her beliefs 
applying Bayes’s rule. Supervisors are evaluated according to the performance ξ 
∈ [0, 1], which is described by the process’ records and has a technology given 
by ξ = αe + e. Effort takes value on (0,  u ξ /(1 + α)] with  u ξ  to be defined below. 
The effort cost function can be written as  ( ) ( )(1 ) C C K = − ￿ i i
￿
 where K measures the 
effectiveness of the signal extraction technology and is increasing in the PUC’s 
funds and in the watchdog groups’ ability to provide hard information. Besides, I 





= ∞ ￿  (with 0 < u ξ < 1), i.e. the full 
precision case is ruled out. Clearly, it is not possible to obtain a perfect signal 
through effort only. The random ability α has support (0, 1) and a natural choice 
is to have α ~ Beta (g, b) with density fy(y; g, b) = [y
g–1(1 – y)




g b y y dy
− − − ∫  - Beta function. The mean is α  = g/(g + b). If g = b = 1, I 
obtain  a  uniform  distribution  on  (0,  1):  from  a  Bayesian  point  of  view  this 
corresponds to the case of uninformative prior on the supervisor ability. The only 
restrictions I impose on g and b is that the distribution is symmetric (g = b) and 
hump-shaped  (informative):  g  >  1  and  b  >  1.  Note  how  α  and  e  assume  the 
meaning of overall measures i.e.: they take into account the different judges’ and 
regulators’  abilities.  The  first  best  arises  either  for  e  or  ξ  verifiable  and 
                                                 
10 This technology simplifies the notation and has the appealing feature that the agent can provide 
verifiable information only when the proof is possible, i.e., β -case (see also Laffont [2000]).   11 
contractible:  “selling  the  store”  contracts  reach  efficiency.  However,  the 
assumption that the planner can write unrestricted contingent contracts with the 
supervisors  does  not  fit  in  any  way  reality  and  so  I  assume  that  ξ  is  always 
observable but not contractible. The timing of the game is as follows: 
1.  Society (planner, firm, regulator and judge if addressed; see stage 3 and 4 
below) learns the nature of the regulatory environment: P(q) and that { } , β β β ∈ . 
Next the firm discovers the only piece of private information: β. 
2.  The  planner  offers  a  menu  of  managerial  reward-cost  pairs  to  the  firm 
contingent to the realization of the signal obtained through the hearing process. 
Moreover,  an  exogenously  given  wage ˆ s,  set  a  reservation  level  (for  sake  of 
simplicity assumed equal for both), is given to the two supervisors.  
3. The regulator chooses the level of effort; next she discovers her random ability 
and, at last, the planner receives the first signal. If this is informative the first best 
is implemented; otherwise a hearing is open and the judge enters the game.  
4. Step 3 is repeated for the judge. If the signal is again uninformative, the planner 
asks for a report to the firm and the asymmetric information regime arises. 
5. Last a reward-quantity pair is implemented and evaluators make their move.
11  
In order to understand the incentives faced by the supervisors as a function of the 
selection rules and the nature of the task, note that two are the dimensions of 
heterogeneity: regulators vs. judges and appointed vs. elected officials. I capture 
the latter referring to the set up developed in Alesina and Tabellini [2005, a]. A 
supervisor receives a payment  ˆ s and she has a utility function given by:  
                                                 
11 For an elected supervisor the evaluator will be a rational electorate. Note how also ALJs are 
elected in the US. The evaluator of appointed supervisors is the industry or a selection committee.   12 
{ } , , , , ˆ ( , ) 1 (1 ) ( ) (1 (1 ) ) ( )
i
i l i l i l i l R e S SR G e S J C e s τ   = + − − − −  
￿                                         (2) 
Here, the parameter τ measures the strength of the career concern incentives. For 
sake of comparison I will exhibit the case of equal draw of α and denote with i = 
{Appointed, Elected} and l = {Regulator, Judge}. In (2), S will be equal to 1 for a 
regulator and 0 for a judge while ( ) ,
i
i l G e  differentiates bureaucrats and politicians. 
A politician’s goal is to be re-elected and this happens if ξ exceeds a thresholdξ . 
This amounts to say that ( ) { } , Pr
E
E l G e ξ ξ = ≥ . Voters are rational and understand 
that the alternative to the incumbent is another politician with average talent who 
will exert effort
exp
, (3/2) E l e ξ = . So I  have  that: ( ) ( ) { }
exp
, , , Pr 3 /2 1
E
E l E l E l G e e e α   = ≥ −   . On 
the other hand, a bureaucrat is career concerned and she wants to maximize the 
perception  of  her  ability  α  given  the  realization  of  the  relevant  measure  of 
performance ξ, i.e.,  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) { }
exp exp
, , , , , E 1 /
A
A l A l A l A l A l G e E E e e e α ξ α   = = + −   . Here, E(·) is 
the evaluator’s expectation over α given the precision realization and E denotes 
the unconditional expectation over ξ. A glance at ( )
E G i  and ( )
A G i  reveals how 
elected supervisors will exert more effort than appointed one. This is due to the 
fact that the density of the Beta evaluated at the mean is always greater than 1 for 
all g and b greater than 1. The relevant inequality is fα(α ) > 1. This result is not 
upset when the distribution of α is asymmetric.
12 Focusing on R and J, they are 
both defined on (0, 1) and represent regulators and judges specific parameters. 
The first one captures the so-called “revolving-door” effect: regulators can be 
attracted by future job opportunities in the regulated industry. The second one (J) 
                                                 
12 Proofs are available upon request. A local result holds if the substitutability between e and α is 
imperfect: ξ = (α + Z)e. Here, I need: [Z + g/(g+b)] fα(α ) > [1 + Zg/(g+b)].   13 
reveals the judges’ desire to leave a legacy of correctness and unbiasedness (see 
also Levy [2005]).
13 Clearly enough the equilibrium level of effort can be ranked 
as follows:  , , ˆ ˆ
S S
E J A J e e >  and  , , ˆ ˆ
S S
E R A R e e >  (see Guerriero [2006 a] for proofs). Moreover 
these levels will be greater the more effective is the supervision technology K. In 
2., the planner foresees the supervisors’ moves and offers to the firm a menu of 
contracts contingent on the eventual signals {σR, σJ} and fully characterized by 
the above equilibrium levels of effort. The planner’s posterior beliefs on β =β  is: 
, , , , , , , ,
, , , , , , , ,
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ (1 { [ ( )] (1 [ ( )]) [ ( )]}) (1 ( , ))
Pr( / , )
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ 1 { [ ( )] (1 [ ( )]) [ ( )]} 1 ( , )
S S S S S S S S
i R i R i R i R i J i J i R i J
R J S S S S S S S S
i R i R i R i R i J i J i R i J
v E e E e E e v e e
v E e E e E e v e e
ξ ξ ξ γ
β β σ φ σ φ
ξ ξ ξ γ
− + − −
= = = = =
− + − −
. 
where
, , ˆ ˆ ( , )
S S
i R i J e e γ  is greater the higher is K and if supervisors are elected. Now, the 
planner’s ex-post expected welfare function writes as follows: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( )
, , , *
, , , ,
, ,
ˆ ˆ 1 ,
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ , 1 , ( ) (1 ) ( )
ˆ ˆ 1 ,
S S
i R i J AI S S S S S S S S
P i R i J i R i J S S
i R i J
v e e
W v e e W v e e V q a q
v e e
γ
γ γ λ β
γ
 −      = + − − + − +      −  
                       
              
( ) , ,
1 ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ( ) ( ) ( ) (1 ) ( ) ( ) 2(1 )
ˆ ˆ 1 ,
S S S S S S
S S
i R i J
v
a a V q a q a s
v e e
ψ λ λ β ψ µ
γ
 −        + − Φ + − + − + − +        −  
(3) 
where µ is the shadow cost of public funds. Again the high type agent obtains an 
optimal allocation while the allocation-effort pair for the low type is given by:  
* ˆ ˆ ( )
S S q q a β = −      i.e.,    ( ) ˆ ˆ ˆ ,
S S S V q c a β ′ = = −    
( ) ( ) ( ) , , ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ 1 , ( ),
1 1
S S S S S
i R i J
v





′ ′ = − − Φ
+ −
                                    (4) 
The results in (4) suggest how the rule giving price as a function of marginal cost 
is the same of the full information case: incentive concerns are entirely taken care 
of  by  the  cost-reimbursement  rule.  In  order  to  lower  the  high  type  rent,  the 
principal is forced to distort away from the first best allocations and toward low 
                                                 
13 The revolving door effect does not seem to exist for ALJs.   14 
power (i.e., low level of effort ˆ S a ) incentive schemes. This distortion is lower the 
more powerful is the signal extraction technology and implicit political incentives 
(election) for supervisors act here as substitute for possibly costly explicit market 
incentives (COS). The following proposition summarizes these findings: 
Proposition 1: A. High powered incentive schemes are linked to the presence of 
elected supervisors and more efficient supervision technologies (higher K). B. An 
increase in the power of the incentive scheme lowers ex-ante regulated prices. 
The above proposition extends the basic insights of the New Regulation Theory 
program’s  (Laffont  and  Tirole  [1993])  to  the  more  realistic  framework  with 
implicitly  interested  supervisors  and  hierarchical  signal  extraction  technology. 
However, it is instructive to insist that the picture drawn in this section is at least 
partially shaded. I always assume a myopic and public interested planner, but 
what  happens  when  partisan  interests  and  concerns  for  the  long  run  firm’s 
profitability affect the planner’s objective function? 
 
3.1 Strategic Price Mechanism Reforms 
Following Laffont and Tirole [1993], a sharp tension between rent extraction and 
investment arises in industrial policies: whether or not the planner can commit to 
a contract contingent on the level of investment, the equilibrium can envision ex 
post expropriation of sank investments. In this sense, non-benevolent supervisors 
may relax such a failure. This intuition proposes several crucial questions: is it 
possible to think of the supervisors’ effort exertion as a pandering activity? If this 
is  the  case,  can  a  possibly  partisan  planner  take  the  expropriation  effect  into 
consideration in choosing among selection rules? How much is this choice driven 
by efficiency concerns and how strong are the rent seeking forces? The answer to   15 
the first question arises naturally when the above model is bridged to the analysis 
in Laffont and Tirole [1993]. Let me assume that before stage 1. The regulated 
firm fixes the level of a non contractible investment of cost I that increases of ζ(I) 







= ∞ with  (1 )/ v v v = −  and that investments are sufficiently effective, i.e. 
( ) 1 ( ) v ζ θ ′ > ∆ i . The planner lacks commitment but anticipates the optimal I (i.e., 
I
*). Ex ante the firm maximizes her expected ex post rent minus investment costs: 
{ }
* , *
0 , , ˆ ˆ ˆ argmax (1 ( ))[1 ( , )] ( ( ))
S S S I
I i R i J I v I e e a I I ζ γ ≥ ∈ + − Φ −                                      (5) 
Employing a revealed preference argument (see Appendix 6.1), (5) clarifies that 
the firm under-invests with respect to the social optimum. Moreover, the objective 
function in (5) suggests that the extent of inefficiency is higher the more precise is 
the planner’s signal and the less powered the incentive scheme is.
14 Indeed, a 
fixed-price contract reaches efficiency but at the cost of a too high rent for the 
high  type.  It  is  now  clear  how  a  planner  caring  enough  about  cost-reducing 
investments, because faced with a high cost market or because strongly interested 
in the firm long run profits will prefer a high-powered performance rule. From a 
long  run  perspective,  the  supervisors’  signal  extraction  activity  can  assume  a 
pandering  feature  when  effort  is  driven  more  by  career  concerns  than  by  a 
farsighted interest in the market efficiency: this dynamic inconsistency is even 
stronger  when  investments  in  reliability  and  quality  services  are  taken  into 
                                                 
14 Such an effect is studied in Sappington [1986]. Here, an institution that prevents a regulator 
from observing the firm’s true cost turns out to be optimal to protect the firm from investments’ 
expropriation. In my model the actual presence of higher powered incentives schemes and the 
appointment rule for supervisors cover the same role.   16 
consideration. These activities do not lower the firm’s cost but increase her long 
run profitability: evidently also a conflict between consumers’ groups will arise 
here. To capture this, I assume that the constitutional reform is decided by the 
incumbent among two parties: one more pro-shareholders R (Republican), and 
one more pro-consumers D (Democratic). Between stages 1. and 2., each party 
faces an election with winning probability xj (j = [D, R]) and decides, if it is the 
winner, the size of ρj, an instrument increasing the investment’s utility for the 
firm, i.e.  ˆ ( , ) j G I ρ . A type j planner attaches a weight J χ ￿  to the latter and a weight 
χj to I. The weights are such that: 1 2 R d χ = + , 1 D d χ = + , 2 1 R d χ = − ￿ ,  1 R d χ = − ￿ . 
So a Republican planner values more I and dislikes less an increase in the firm’s 
utility. The following properties hold: 1 11 0, 0 G G > < , 11 2 22 12 0, 0, 0, 0 G G G G < > < > , 
21 0 G > . The firm shows risk aversion toward non cost-reducing investments and, 
defining
* , ˆ ˆ ( ( ), ) ( , )
S I
j I a i I i j ρ ≡ , the following regularities hold: 
111 112 11 12 G G G G ≥   
and  , ,
11 11 ˆ ˆ ( ( , ), ) ( , ) ( ( , ), ) ( , ) 1
S I S I
j j G I i R I i R a G I i D I i D a ρ ρ     ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ≥           (6) 
Before stage 3., the firm chooses the non-observable and non-contractible I as to 
maximize her expected ex post utility subject to the budget constraint: 
{ }
* ,
0 ˆ ˆ ˆ argmax ( , ) ( ) . .: ( )
S I
I j I G I t a st A p c q t I ρ ψ ≥ + − + − ≥ + .                                     (7)  
I
* depends from both the power of the incentive scheme and the level of ρj and the 
inter-party distance d and the optimal ρ are such that: ˆ ˆ R D ρ ρ > and  d λ > . So I 
have  that: 
, ,
1 1 ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ( , ) ( , ) 0
S I S I
R D I a I a ρ ρ ≥ ≥ .  Clearly,  a  partisan  planner  takes  into 
account the political uncertainty and increases the power of the scheme the deeper 
the fear of expropriation is. Defining  ˆ ( ( , ), ) ( , ) j G I i j G i j ρ ≡ , the ex post expected 
welfare function for a type j planner is:   17 
( )
, , , ( , ) ( ) ( ) (1 ) ( , ) ( 1 ) ( , ) 1 ( , )
AI S I AI S
j P j j W i j W i v i G i j I i j G i j I γ λ χ χ λ ο   = + + + + − − − −∂ ∂  
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ . 
with ( , ) ( , ) ( ( , ) ( , )) j I i j I i j x I i j I i j ≡ − + − − ￿ and ( , ) ( , ) ( ( , ) ( , )) j G i j G i j x G i j G i j ≡ − + − − ￿ . 
The equilibrium effort for the low type firm is defined as:  ( )
, ˆ S I a ψ ′ =  
( ) {
, , , 1 1 ˆ ˆ ( ) (1 ) ( , )
1 1
S I S I S I
j q v i a G i j a
v
γ λ λ χ
λ
 ′ = − Φ − + + ∂ ∂ +  + −
￿ ￿  
             }
, 2 , ( 1 ) ( , ) ( , )
S I S I
j I i j a G i j I a χ λ ο    − − − ∂ ∂ + ∂ ∂ ∂   
￿ ￿ .                (8) 
Non  contractibility  of  investment  along  with  sharp  conflicts  over  the  size  of 
investments’ aids among different consumer groups generate the last three new 
and positive terms in the cost-reimbursement rule. These terms are affected by 
both the inter-party distance d and the holding on power xj. The latter effect is 
diametrically  different  among  contrasting  partisan  planners  when  the  role  of 
public incentives is greater (condition (6)). Such a strategic institutional design
15 
extends to the incentive schemes’ reform the foundations suggested by Guerriero 
[2006 a] to the supervisors’ selection rules. Proposition 2 summarizes as follows: 
Proposition 2: A. Higher powered incentive schemes will be linked to high cost 
industries. B. The likelihood of a reform toward more powerful incentive schemes 
is  higher  the  higher  is  the  inter-party  distance  and  the  higher  (lower)  is  the 
holding on power if the reformer is Republican (Democratic). The presence of a 
Republican incumbent reformer increases the likelihood of these reforms.  
These results are strongly at odd with the seminal analysis in Laffont [1996]. 
There  the  relation  with  an  incumbent  Republican  has  opposite  signs  and  the 
                                                 
15 Several studies demonstrate that a lack of permanence in office can inspire policymakers to 
employ institutional reforms either to influence political outcomes or to impose constraints on 
future incumbents (see Persson and Svensson [1988] and Tabellini and Alesina [1990]).   18 
incentive rule was insensitive to the holding on power with a Democratic planner. 
The deep reason is that when loosing the chance of fixing the preferred level of ρj 
becomes more costly (high inter-party distance) an incumbent planner is willing 
to distort the incentive scheme even more toward less rent extraction.  
 
3.2 Robustness: Lobbying and Bribing 
When positive rents remain in equilibrium, they can be employed to capture either 
partisan parties or directly supervisors. Indeed, Proposition 1 results somewhat 
weakened when an organized group interested in maximizing the regulated firm’s 
rent is considered. Both  ALJs and PUCs’ commissioners exert effort  in other 
tasks. As seen above, examples are the control of bypassing by non-regulated 
utilities and the analysis of environmental regulation. Well, it turns out that the 
organized  group  can  relax  the  supervision  constraint  offering  side-contracts 
conditional on this second effort level supposed observable and contractible;
16 As 
in Alesina and Tabellini [2005 a], the interest group has all the bargaining power 
and  influences  supervisors  either  directly  (bribes)  or  indirectly  (campaign 
contributions)  before  the  effort  is  decided  in  stages  3.  or  in  4..  The  level  of 
performance from the extra task h brings a small positive extra-utility to the firm 
but  implies  a  relevant  cost  of  effort  to  the  supervisor  as  captured  by  a  non-




i l i l C e e + . In a jointly optimal equilibrium 
, ˆ 0
S
i l e =  
so  that  the  high  type’s  firm  enjoys  a  higher  informational  rent  (proofs  are 
available upon request). Even if discouraging, these equilibria are fragile and the 
                                                 
16 Here I take aside the eventual multiple principal-multiple agents’ strategic interaction, i.e. cost 
minimization across supervisors’ side payments.  This remains as open agenda for future research.     19 
following remarks apply: 1 Bribes do not arise if the punishment that a supervisor 
receives  if  caught  is  high  enough;  2  Campaign  contributions,  although  legal, 
would  be  not  even  affordable  for  the  interest  group,  which  has  to  reimburse 
supervisors for the entire amount of implicit incentives (multiplicative precision 
technology); 3. Judges are less corruptible even if the return to bribe them is 
higher (they exert a higher level of effort). Thus, provided that implicit incentives 
are high enough - high values of τ, R and J in (1) - the model remains robust to 
possible lobbying and bribing. The next section will face this complex theory, 
except  the  firm’s  lobby  part,  to  the  data.  The  next  section  will  subject  this 
complex theory, except the interest group part, to the U.S. electric market’s data. 
 
4.  Evidence 
The main contribution of the empirical part of the paper is to address finally the 
constitutional determinants of the reform of cost-reimbursement rules in regulated 
market, giving, besides, evidence on the effect of the reforms toward performance 
based regulations on the US Electric power market prices. As Table 2.A and 2.B 
report, between 1982 and 2002, 41 of the 144 major IOUs operating in the US 
electric power market switched to some kind of performance based regulations. 
This enormous wave of change has been interesting 25 of the 49 continental US 
states and constitutes a perfect source of variation able to test the above model. 
The empirical questions are: what forces have shaped the reforming planners’ 
incentives at the constitutional tables? How strong were the political positions and 
how much did the reformer take into consideration efficiency reasons? Can the 
data reveal the extent of substitutability between market and political institutions?    20 
Such a wide variation over cross sections (i.e. states and firms within states) and 
time nicely lends itself to a panel approach; moreover, as underlined in Persson 
and Tabellini [2003], a cross sectional analysis will deliver here fragile inference 
given  the  “non-random  pattern  of  constitutional  reforms  and  the  extensive 
differences  among  [individuals]  belonging  to  different  constitutional  groups.” 
Thus,  I  will  make  use  of  two  main  models  for  evaluating  respectively  the 
determinants of the constitutional reforms and the effects of PBRs on prices: 1. a 
random  effects  panel  with  dependent  variable  a  binary  for  the  presence  of 
performance-based  regulations;  2.  a  panel  pass-trough  pricing  equation. 
Proposition 1 and 2 arise a set of empirical predictions summarized as follows:  
Empirical Prediction: 1. A. High powered incentive schemes are linked to more 
efficient supervision technologies, high cost industries and elected supervisors. B. 
High powered incentive schemes are more likely with Republican reformers, the 
higher is the inter-party distance and the higher (lower) is the holding on power if 
the incumbent reforming party was Republican (Democratic). 2. High powered 
incentive schemes lower the level of equilibrium prices.  
 
4.1 Non Random Constitution Selection 
First of all, let define institutions. The high powered incentive schemes’ dummy 
(PBR_F and PBR) takes value 1 if the firm (or the state) adopts a broadly defined 
(rate freeze, price or revenue cap with possible earnings sharing)
17 performance 
based  regulation and 0 otherwise (i.e., cost  of service regulation).  In order  to 
evaluate the Empirical Prediction, I make use of several proxies for the efficiency 
                                                 
17 See EEI, [2000] and Sappington et al. [2001] for a precise definition of each scheme.   21 
of  the  production  and  signal  extraction  technologies  and  the  inter-party 
competition. The latter is captured by the absolute distance between Democrats 
and Republicans (Av_Dist) while the incumbent’s holding on power is measured 
by the average percentage of seats held by the majority party (Av_Maj).
18 Let me 
define selection rules as: Jud_Elec, an elected judges’ dummy, and Reg_Elec, an 
elected regulators’ dummy. More complex it is to find proxies able to directly 
quantify the efficiency of the supervision technology; my strategy is to use the 
two sets of observables that most likely enhance the likelihood of information 
extraction: proxies for the presence of powerful watchdog groups and proxies for 
the amount of staff’s resources. The first set includes: Young (proportion aged 5-
17), Ind and Res (proportion of revenues form sales to industrial and residential 
users  respectively).  Staff’s  resources  are  measured  by  the  PUC’s  staff  budget 
(Budget)  and  the  number  of  permanent  staff’s  members  (Employ).  The  latter, 
unfortunately, is a very crude proxy for efficiency; different and unobservable (in 
my data) skills are required to the PUC’s members so it is not clear in what 
measure higher values of Employ provide the planner with a more precise signal 
or  instead  relax  the  assumed  benevolence.  Finally,  investments’  concerns  are 
captured by proxies for costly generation (cst) and more crudely by residential 
prices (Rkhr). Generations by nuclear and fuel sources (Gen_Fuel, Gen_Nucl) are 
introduced (one at the time to avoid multicollinearity) to control for difference in 
generation sources across states. Finally, other controls are state population (Pop), 
income (Income) and electricity sales (Sales). A full account of the variables’ 
source and construction is given in the Appendix 6.2 and Table 1. Table 3 presents 
the results of the random effects Logit model. While columns (1) and (2) report, 
                                                 
18 See Hanssen [2004] for a detailed explanation of the proxies’ choice.    22 
respectively, the estimates for a panel of 49 states for the samples 1970-1997 and 
1980-1997; column (3) shows the evidence when the same model is estimated for 
a panel of 143 firms over the same 49 states over the period 1980-1997 (the 
Potomac Electric Power Company is excluded given the non-availability of data 
points for the District of Columbia). Note that in column (3), the right hand side 
variables vary only across states and time and identification is obtained through 
the  firms  specific  random  effects.  The  evidence  strongly  supports  the  model 
predictions. For what concern the proxies for the holding on power, the results 
arbitrate clearly in favor of the strategic use explanation. The holding on power 
increases the probability of a reform toward higher powered incentive schemes if 
interacted with a Republican incumbent while the sign of Av_Maj is negative 
within the Democratic incumbents’ group. Republican incumbent are more likely 
to reform toward PBR.
19 All the proxies are highly significant (almost all at 1%-
5%) except Av_Maj in column (1) and Av_Dist in columns (1) and (3). Looking to 
selection rules, it is clear (even if Jud_Elec is significant at 20% in column (3) 
and negative in column (2)) that the planner substitutes out costly rent-extraction 
incentives (COS) with accountability-driving institutions. A bit more mixed is the 
evidence  on  the  efficiency  of  the  signal  extraction  technology.  The  relevant 
proxies show the correct sign except Employ always negative and Res and Ind 
negative in columns (2) and (3). While the first sign comes at no surprise given 
the above remark, an appealing explanation for the last two is that, in a dynamic 
set up, the friction between supervisors and interested parties would become so 
                                                 
19 The impact of an incumbent Republican reformer is given by the sum of the coefficient on Rep 
plus the coefficient on PBR*Rep multiplied for the mean of Av_Maj. In columns (1) and (3) these 
figures are respectively: 4.26 = – 25.54 + 44.48*0.67 and 5.43 = – 15.00 + 31.92*0.64.    23 
sour to deteriorate the quality of the signal. Finally investment concerns (high cost 
industries) increase the attractiveness of high powered cost-reimbursement rules. 
Section 4.2 closes the empirical evidence looking to the relation between price 
and high powered incentive schemes. To this extent, a wide literature, mainly 
based on telecommunications’ market data, has delivered the following stylized 
facts: PBRs delivers lower prices and higher earnings with no relevant reduction 
in overall service quality.
20 What these studies lack is an endogenous treatment of 
the regulatory institutions: the next section will fill this hole. 
 
4.2 Pricing Models 
The model considered relates electricity prices charged at state level to various 
cost items plus fixed effect terms for regulation regimes. Utilities set prices at 
system wide average costs. The only rough and available measure is the fossil 
fuels’ component (see Besley and Coate [2003]). This item is useful in assessing 
the pass through of cost shocks into prices and helps in controlling the differences 
in  the production  structures. Thus, I test point 2.  of the Empirical Prediction 
running, for each customer class, a panel regression of the form: 
, 1 , 2 , 3 , _ _ _ s t s t s t s t s t p Reg Elec Jud Elec Jud Elec η ϑ φ φ φ = + + + + +     
                      1 , , 2 , , 3 , , , _ s t s t s t s t s t s t s t PBR c Jud Elec c c Con υ υ υ ϕ ε + + + + + .                  (9) 
In (9)  , s t p  is a price for state s in year t;  s η  are state fixed effects controlling for 
long-run differences in production and distribution systems;  t ϑ  are year dummies 
                                                 
20  Sappington  et  al.  [2001]  offer  a  complete  and  clear  cut  summary  of  the  literature.  Kridel, 
Sappington and Weisman [1996] is a review of the first pieces of evidence on PBRs. The same 
scope has Hill [1995] for studies focusing on the electric power market.   24 
picking up macro-shocks and common changes in federal policy;  , s t Con  includes 
state specific time varying controls (Gen_Fuel, Gen_Nucl, Income, Income
2, Pop, 
Pop
2, Sales) and proxies for the efficiency of the supervision technology: Res, 
Ind, Young, Budget, Employ.  , s t PBR ,  , _ s t Jud Elec  and  , _ s t Reg Elec represent the 
time varying dummies for PBRs and election rules respectively. Table 10 reports 
the main figures. The model has always an explanatory power higher than 85% 
and all the proxies for the efficiency of the supervision technology (not shown) 
are highly significant and have an attached coefficient with the correct sign. The 
coefficient  on  costs  interacted  with  whether  a  state  has  switched  incentive 
schemes is always negative but never significant when  , _ s t Jud Elec  is included. 
The high significance of the latter suggests that implicit political incentives are 
more  effective.  This  would  also  explain  in  an  appealing  way  the  lags  in  the 
introduction of PBRs in the US. The direct effect of  , s t PBR  is both significant and 
positive on residential and commercial rates. Can these results be driven by a 
failure in conditional independence? Table 5 addresses such a question. Here, (9) 
is estimated with the Arellano-Bond procedure without fixed effects but with one 
lag of the dependent variable; Av_Maj, Rep, Av_Maj*Rep only are employed as 
extra instruments to avoid weak instrumentation (the over-identifying restrictions 
are never rejected). As column (1) through (3) show the indirect effect of  , s t PBR  
is not significant but now null; the direct effect becomes negative: OLS seems to 
overestimate the overall effect of the reform toward more powerful schemes. This 
has a significant (at 10%) marginal negative effect on residential prices implying 
a 2.5% reduction on the residential bills over the 1970-1997 sample. The weak 
significance is mainly due to the variation captured by the first lag of prices.   25 
5.  Concluding Remarks 
As the theoretical section broadly explains price-cap and cost-plus regulation do 
arbitrate  the  rent-efficiency  trade-off  in  quite  different  ways:  an  eventually 
partisan  planner  would  take  into  account  not  only  the  different  comparative 
advantages  of  different  rules  but  would  also  use  strategically  more  powered 
schemes to tie the hands of new incumbents’ parties. I test these propositions on a 
panel of U.S. states. The results show how the probability of a reform from a low 
powered incentive scheme to a higher powered one has been linked to Republican 
incumbents, a higher interparty distance, high cost structures and the presence of 
more efficient supervision technology and elected supervisors. Less clear remains 
the effect  of  PBRs  on  regulated  prices;  OLS  tend  to  overestimate  the  overall 
effect of the reform on electricity rates and such an effect seems to be negative 
even if significant only for residential rates. However the point remains as open 
agenda for further research along with a multidimensional analysis of differently 
powered incentive rules.
21 All in all, the evidence on the constitutional reforms’ 
likelihood is robust to different estimation procedures and disturbance hypotheses 
and rationalizes the great wave of change that has interested the market during the 
last decades.  Indeed, at the constitutional  table,  planners  have  solved the rent 
extraction vs. efficiency trade off substituting out, according to their own partisan 
interests, costly - in terms of efficiency - explicit market’s incentives (i.e., cost of 
service) with implicit institutional accountability designs (i.e., election). 
                                                 
21 When I employ a multinomial Logit and an ordered Logit estimator, the main results remain 
unchanged (not shown). In the latter model PBR is set equal to 1 if a COS regulation is employed, 
3 if a pure price cap is in use and 2 if any other PBR scheme is the incentive scheme adopted.   26 
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6.1 Solution without Supervision and Investment Concerns 
Maximizing (1) with respect of U, e and q yields the following: 
1. The existence of the shadow cost of rewards implies no rent for the firm: 
U = 0                                    or                    t ≡ ψ(a*); 
2. The disutility of effort is equalized to the saving in average cost at the margin: 
ψ′ (a*) = q*                        or                    a ≡ a*;                                                                                      
3. The social marginal value and cost of output are equalized:  
V′ (q) = (1+λ) (β – a)             or             S′ (q) = p = c.         30 
The regulated firm receives a price p implicitly defined by the following contract: 
A + p
PCq(p
PC) = S′ (q) = d – (C – C*).  
Here d = ψ(a*) and PC stands for price cap. The firm chooses a in order to maximize a – 
((β – a)q – C*) – ψ(a).
22 A price–cap gives the right incentives for cost reduction and the 
fixed charge C* can be tailored to fully extract the firm’s rent.                                         ■ 
The socially optimal ˆ I  minimizes the sum of investment costs and ex post costs:                                                                                            
[ ] ˆ argmin (1 ( )) 1 (1 ( )) (1 ( )) I I I v I v I I v I ζ β ζ β β ζ β ∈ + + + − + = + − + ∆                       (A.1) 
This amounts to say that the objective in (A.1) assumes a value greater at I
* than at  ˆ I .  
Evidently, the same can be said for the objective function in (5). Once I sum these two 
inequalities, the following expression holds in equilibrium: 
* * * * *
, , ˆ ˆ (1 ( )) (1 ( ))[1 ( , )] ( ( ))
S S
i R i J I v I v I e e a I I β ζ β ζ γ + − + ∆ + + − Φ − ≥ 
*
, , ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ (1 ( )) (1 ( ))[1 ( , )] ( ( ))
S S
i R i J I v I v I e e a I I β ζ β ζ γ + − + ∆ + + − Φ −  
or  { }
* *
, , ˆ ˆ ˆ ( ( ) ( )) [1 ( , )] ( ( )) 0
S S
i R i J v I I e e a I ζ ζ β γ − ∆ − − Φ ≥ . Given the properties of  ( ) ζ ′ i  and 
the first order conditions of (5), this inequality is met for 
* ˆ ( ) ( ) I I ζ ζ ≥  or
* ˆ I I ≤ . Noting 
how, if it is likely, the cost of investment is lower in low cost market and taking the 
comparative statics with respect to K, Proposition 2.B follows.                                        ■ 
 
6.2 Data 
This analysis exploits both cross sectional and time variation in the data. Three are the 
main data sets: a panel of 49 states for the samples 1970-1997 (1372 observations) and 
1980-1997 (888 observations) and a panel of 143 firms over the same 49 states over the 
period 1980-1997 (2574 observations). Nebraska has been excluded because it has no 
investor–owned utilities while the District of Columbia is not considered because no data 
points are available before 1987. Unbalanced panels deliver the same results. 
                                                 
22 Note that, as long as the planner knowsβ, she can infer effort from the observation of cost.     31 
B.1 Data on incentive schemes are directly collected from:  
B.1.1 EEI, [2000], PBR Survey (Member Survey), EEI, Washington D.C. 
B.1.2 Sappington, D. E.M., J. P. Pfeifenberger, P. H. and G. N. Basheda, [2001]. 
B.2 Data on electric prices, generation and the price of fossil fuels (composite) per net 
Kwh are collected or calculated from the EEI (Edison Electric Institute) yearbook: 
EEI, [1995], 1960-1992: Historical Statistics of the Electric Utility Industry; 
EEI, [1993-1997], Statistical Yearbook of the Electric Utility Industry, Washington DC. 
EEI refers to the source of data for its yearbooks to various places including DOE, EIA, 
Federal Power Commission and FERC. EEI reports annual revenues (in dollar terms) and 
sales (in Kwh) by state and class of service. Prices are calculated from the revenues and 
sales in terms of cents per Kwh. Residential, commercial and industrial users account for 
the 95% of revenues. EEI reports electric generation and sources of energy for generation 
in two types of breakdown, i.e., by type of prime mover driving the generator and by 
energy source. The totals from the two of them are consistent. I used the second one. 
B.3 To construct the fossil fuel cost index for state i in year t, let sjit be the share of 
energy source j in state i in year t and let pit be the price of fossil fuels (composite) per net 
Kwh (in cents per Kwh) for state i in year t, calculated as:  pit  =  Σj (qjit/qit) pijt. Then the 
fossil fuel cost series will be given by cit = Σj sjit pit where sit is the share of electricity 
produced in state i in year t by the fossil fuel energy sources j (i.e.: coal, gas and oil). 
B.4 Data on regulatory selection rules, PUCs’ budgets and number of PUCs’ full time 
employees are collected directly from: 
NARUC, [1970-1997], Yearbook of Regulatory Agencies, NARUC, Washington DC. 
B.5 Political preferences are from the CSG (Council of State Governments) yearbooks: 
CSG, [1970-1997], The Book of the States, CSG, Lexington, KY. 
B.6  Data  on  judges’  selection  rule  and  length  terms  are  collected  from  Hanssen,  F. 
Andrew [2004, Table 1] and Besley, Timothy and A. Abigail Payne, [2003, Table 1].    32 
B.7 State income per capita, population, proportion aged over 65 and proportion aged 5-
17 are calculated from a U.S. Census Bureau (UCB) publication: 








Table 1: Variable Names and Descriptions. 




Dummy taking value 1 if the rule is in use in the state, 0 otherwise. 
(PBR_F = Dummy taking value 1 if the firm uses the rule, 0 
otherwise). 











Percentage of seats (averaged across upper and lower houses) held by 
majority party.  
 
Absolute difference between percentage of seats held by Democrats 
and Republicans. 
 





Dummy taking value 1 if commissioners are elected, 0 otherwise. 
 






PUC’s total receipts in thousands dollars.  
 










Percentage of population aged 65 and over. 
 
Percentage of population aged 5-17. 
 
Percentage of Sales from customers who are residential. 
 
Percentage of Sales from customers, which are industrial. 











Percentage of total generation from fossil fuels sources. 
 
Percentage of total generation from nuclear source. 
 
Sales in thousands Mwh. 
 
State population in thousands people. 
 
State income in thousands dollars.   33 
 
                    Table 2.A: PBR in the U.S. Electric Power Market (1970-2002). 
States  IOUs  PBR   Period 
AL  AL Po. Co. ;  Rate case moratorium;  1982-2002 
AZ  AZ Pu. Se. Co. ,  




AR  Entergy AR Inc. ;  None;   
CA 
Pacific Gas & El. Co. , 
San Diego Gas & El. Co. , * 
Southern CA Edison;* 
None, 
Revenue and price cap with earnings sharing (see also case A.98-01-014), 




CO#  Pu. Se. Co. of CO;*  Rate case moratorium with earnings sharing (see also case 95A and 99A-531EG);   1996-2006 
CT 
Citizen Utilities Co. ,  
CT Light & Po. Co. ,* 
United Illuminating Co. ; 
None, 
Price cap (see also case 99-06-21 filed in 2000),  
None;   
 
2000-2001 
DE  Delmarva Po. & Light Co.;  None;   
DC  Potomac El. Po. Co.;  None;   
FL 
FL Po. & Light Co. , 
FL Po. Co. , 
Gulf Po. Co. , 









GA  GA Po. Co. , 




HI  HI El. ,* 
Maui El. Co. Ltd. ; 
Price cap with earnings sharing (see also case 96-0493 filed 1996), 
None; 
1997-1999 
ID  ID Po. Co. ;  None;   
IL 
Central IL Light Co. , 
Central IL Pu. Se. Co. ,* 
Commonwealth Edison Co. , 
IL Po. Co. , 
Mt. Carmel Pu. Se. Co. ; 
Price cap with earnings sharing, 
Price cap with earnings sharing,  
Price cap with earnings sharing, 
Price cap with earnings sharing, 







IN Michigan Po. Co. , 
Indianapolis Po. & Light Co. , 
Northern In. Pu.Se.Co. , 
PSI Energy Inc. , 








Interstate Po. Co. ,  
IES Ut. Inc. , 
MidAmerican Energy Co.;* 
None,  
None, 




KS  KS Gas & El.Co., 





KY.Po. Co. , 
KY Ut. Co. , 
Louisville Gas & El. Co. ,* 
Union Light Heat & Po. Co.; 
None, 
None, 






Central LA Inc. , 
Entergy LA Inc. ,* 
Entergy New Orleans Inc. , 
Southwestern El. Po. Co. ; 
None, 






Bangor Hydro-El. Co. , 
Central ME Po. Co. ,  
ME Pu. Se. Co. ;* 
Rate freeze for distribution services,  
Revenue-per-customer cap and price cap with earnings sharing,  




MD  Baltimore Gas & El. Co. ,* 
Potomac El. Co.;* 
Price cap (see also case 8794/8804 filed in 1998),  




Boston Edison Co. , 
Cambridge El. Light Co. , 
Commonwealth El. Co. , 
Eastern Edison Co. ,* 
Fitchburg Gas & El. Light Co. , 
MA El. Co. , 




Revenues sharing (see also case 96/94 filed in 1998),  
None,  
Rate freeze with earning sharing,  









Consumers Energy Co. , 
Detroit Edison Co. , 
Edison Sault El. Co. , 







MN Po. & Light Co., 
Northern State Po. Co. , 
Otter Tail  Po. Co.;* 
None,  
Price cap with earnings sharing, 




MS  Entergy MS Po. Co. ,* 
MS Po. Co.;* 
Benchmarks (see also case 93-UA-301 filed in 1994),  




Empire District  El. Co. , 
Kansas City Po. & Light Co. , 
St Joseph Light & Po. Co. , 
Union El. Co. ,* 










MT  MT Po. Co. ;*  Price cap with earnings sharing (see also D95.9.128 filed 1996);  1997-1998 
NV  NV Po. Co. ,  None;   
   34 
 
                Table 2.B: PBR in the U.S. Electric Power Market (1970-2002). 
States  IOUs  PBR   Period 
NV  Sierra Pacific Po. Co.;  None;   
NH  Pu. Se. Co. of NH;  None;   
NJ 
Atlantic City El. Co. , 
Jersey Central Po. & Light Co. , 
Pu. Se. El. & Gas Co. , 






NM  Pu. Se. Co. of NM;  None;   
NY 
Central Hudson Gas & El. Co. , 
Consolidated Edison Co.– NY Inc. ,  
Long Island Lighting Co. , 
NY State El. & Gas Co. ,* 
Niagara Mohawk Po. Co. ,* 
Orange & Rockland Utils Inc., 
Rochester Gas and El. Co.;* 
None, 
Revenue-per-customer cap with earnings sharing, 
None, 
Price-cap (for base rates) with earnings sharing (see also case 96-E-0891),  
Revenue cap and rate freeze- price cap, 
None,  









Carolina Po. & Light Co. , 
Duke Po. Co. , 





ND  MDU Resources Group Inc.;  None;   
OH 
Cincinnati Gas & El. Co. , 
Cleveland El. Illumination Co. , 
Columbus Southern Po. Co. , 
Dayton Po. & Light Co. , 
OH Edison Co. , 
OH Po. Co. , 









OK  OK Gas & El. Co. , 




OR  PacifiCorp ,* 
Portland General El. Co. ; 




Duquesne Light Co. , 
Metropolitan Edison Co. , 
PA El. Co. , 
PA Po. & Light Co. , 
PA Po. Co. , 
PECO Energy Co. , 










Blackstone Valley Electric Co. ,* 
Narragansett Electric Co. ,* 
Newport Electric Co. ;* 
Price cap with earnings sharing (see also case 2498/2514 filed in 1996),  
Price cap and rate freeze with earnings sharing,  




SC  Lockhart Power Co. , 




SD  Black Hills Co. ; 
Northwestern Pu. Se. Co. ; 
Rate freeze (see also case EL95-003 filed in 1995), 
None; 
1995-2005 
TN  Kingsport Po. Co. ;  None;   
TX 
Central Po. & Light Co. , 
El Paso El. Co. , 
Entergy Gulf States Inc. , 
Houston Lighting & Po. Co. , 
Southwestern El. Se. Co. , 
Southwestern Pu. Se. Co. , 
TX Utilities Electric Co. ,* 
TX-New Mexico Power Co. ,*  


















VT  Central VT Pu. Se. Co. , 




VA  Appalachian Po. Co. , 




WA  Puget Sound Energy 




WV  Monongahela Po. Co. , 





Consolidated Water Po. Co. , 
Madison Gas & El. Co. ,  
Northern States Po. Co. , 
Northwestern WI El. Co. , 
Pioneer Po. & Light Co. , 
South Beloit Water Gas & El. Co. , 
Superior Water Light & Po. Co. , 
WI El. Po. Co. , 
WI Po. & Light Co. , 












Notes:  1. El., Inc., Po., Pu., Se. are for respectively Company, Electric, Incorporation, Power, Public, Service; 
             2. IOUs included in the EEI report show the * index; 
             3. Relevant PUC’s docket in parentheses. 










               Table 3: Determinants of Incentive Schemes - RE Logit Estimates.  
  (1)  (2)  (3) 
Dependent Var.:  PBR  PBR  PBR_F 









































































Rkhr      2.702 
(0.627)*** 
Gen_Nucl  -14.211 
(6.277)** 
   
Gen_Fuel    -122.461 
(44.931)*** 
 






























Estimation  Random Effects Logit  Random Effects Logit  Random Effects Logit 
N. of Obs.                   1372  882  2574 
Log Likelihood  - 58.469  - 45.212  - 109.498 
Note:  1.  Standard errors in parentheses; 
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Table 4: Results on Pass-Through - Fixed Time/State Effects Estimates. 
  (1)  (2)  (3) 
Dependent Var.:  Rkhr  Rkhc  Rkhi 






































Other  Controls  Budgetst  , Employst  , Resst  , Indst  , Youngst  , Gen_Fuelst  , 
Gen_Nuclst  , Popst  , (Popst)
2 , Incomest  , (Incomest)
2 , Salesst .
 
Estimation  Fixed time and state effects (within) estimator. 
N. of Obs.  1372  1372  1372 
R
2  0.89  0.87  0.85 
Notes:  1. Standard errors in parentheses;      





Table 5: Results on Pass-Through - Arellano-Bond Estimates. 
  (1)  (2)  (3) 
Dependent Var.:  Rkhr  Rkhc  Rkhi 












Other  Controls  Constantst ,Dependent Var.(-1)st  , Reg_Elecst  , Jud_Elecst , 
Jud_Elecst .cst  , cst  , Budgetst  , Employst  , Resst  , Indst  , Youngst  , 
Gen_Fuelst  , Gen_Nuclst  , Popst  , (Popst)




Instruments  Av_Majst ,Av_Majst*Repst , Repst  . 
Estimation  Arellano-Bond estimator for dynamic panel. 
Ov-Id Test (P-Value)  0.98  0.99  0.99 
N. of Obs.  1274  1274  1274 
Notes:  1. Robust standard errors in parentheses;      
            2. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%; 
            3. One-step results employed for inference on coefficients. 
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1.  Introduction 
A major task of economics is to explain the pattern of government intervention in 
industries that is to say industrial policy. An idealized, but illuminating, view of 
regulatory  institutions  is  that  they  result  from  a  broadly  defined  constitution 
drafted by some benevolent “founders” behind a veil of ignorance. This “public 
interest” research program derives policies able to correct market failures such as 
monopoly pricing. In the last twenty years this paradigm has been substantially 
improved by explicitly considering informational asymmetries. Indeed, industrial 
policy can be thought as resulting from the optimal trade-off between efficiency 
enhancement  and  rent  extraction  and,  in  regulating  a  natural  monopoly,  the 
planner would select optimal cost-reimbursement rules, which arbitrate differently 
between cost reducement effort (moral hazard) and informational rents (adverse 
selection). Price-cap favours efficiency, while cost of service regulation (COS) 
favours rent extraction. However, the public interest approach completely fails in 
taking into account both the watchdog role of consumers’ interest groups and the 
delicate set of checks on bureaucrats and politicians. Judges have discretionary 
power and they can compete with executive branches and regulators in filling in 
unforeseen  contingencies  (see  Shapiro  [1986],  Spiller  and  Tiller  [1999]  and 
Guerriero [2006 a]). Politicians may favour interest groups leaving substantial 
rents  to  the  officials  involved  in  regulation  (see  Becker  [1985]  and  Wilson 
[1980]). Recently, the New Theory of Regulation program has tried to overcome 
such  an  inconsistency,  employing  both  principal-agent  and  political  economy 
models. The main merits of this literature are two: 1. the explicit design of the   3 
political system details and of the positive forces driving public intervention; 2. 
the crucial role entrusted to private information in giving rent seeking incentives 
to regulated firms’ interest groups and a signal extraction role to the hierarchical 
structure  of  real  world  regulatory  institutions.  When  explicit  contracts  on 
observable performances or  efforts are available for supervisors, the low type 
quantity-effort allocation is distorted even more to take into account the eventual 
capture, the institutional design of the supervision hierarchy (Laffont and Tirole 
[1993] and Laffont and Martimort [1999]), and the planner’s partisan interests 
(Laffont [1996, 2000]). In collusion-proof equilibria (i.e. in which capture does 
not prevail), costly incentive payments are given to non-benevolent regulators for 
a  value  equal  to  the  maximum  expected  collusion  offer,  which  is  the  firm’s 
expected stake (i.e. high type rent). Nevertheless, this set up basically fails in 
capturing real world institutions. Regulators and judges are implicitly motivated 
by simple election-appointment rules and the review processes’ structure makes 
difficult to swallow the hypothesis that the effective role of these officials is one 
of decision making (i.e.: to report the signal). Only recently, Guerriero [2006, a] 
has  given  a  first  complete  and  realistic  description  of  this  complex  agency 
structure. A hierarchical rate review process emphasizes the judges’ generosity of 
settlement, rendering the judicial role pivotal when judges want to leave a legacy 
of correctness (“legacy effect”) and regulators are not willing to exert costly effort 
because they are interested in obtaining job offers from the industry (“revolving 
door  effect”).  Election  strengthens  the  first  effect  and  damps  the  second  one. 
Possibly partisan planners will take into consideration the efficiency of the signal 
extraction technology and the accountability power of different selection rules in 
designing the regulatory institutions. This paper brings two main contributions: 1.   4 
it broadens the scope of the Guerriero [2006 a]’s model to the optimal selection of 
incentive schemes; 2. it empirically evaluates, for the first time in literature, the 
merit of different cost-reimbursement selection theories, proving the explanatory 
power of the model developed in Section 3 when faced with US electricity data. 
Even if from 1997 a big wave of change is trying to enhance competition within 
U.S. regulated markets, electricity firms along with all the other major utilities 
(natural  gas,  trucking,  telecommunications,  water  and  wastewater,  insurance, 
railroad) are still regulated through the hierarchical structures analyzed below. 
Moreover, the rising demand for technical specialization of judges involved in 
regulation cases
1 makes the U.S. lesson increasingly crucial in understanding how 
to correctly design the regulatory institutions of many European markets. The 
remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides details about 
the US electricity market. Section 3 clarifies the efficiency-driven and strategic 
determinants of incentive schemes; while section 4 tests the theory considering 
the reform towards performance based regulations (PBR) in the US electric power 
market. Section 5 discusses the evidence proposing an agenda for future research. 
The Appendix contains tables, proofs and a detailed description of the data. 
 
2. Institutions 
Investor-owned  electric  utilities  (IOUs)  account  for  over  three-fourths  of  the 
electricity sales and revenues of the U.S. electric power market. While jurisdiction 
                                                 
1 The Ahlstrom vs. European Commission [1993] and Enel vs. Wind-Infostrada [2002] cases have 
stressed the need for a “gate-keeper” role of administrative judges as regards economics experts 
witnesses within regulation-antitrust trials (see also Breyer [2003] and Motta [2004]).    5 
over both interstate transmission and wholesale transactions lies inside a federal 
body (FERC), retail services are regulated by state public utility commissions 
(PUCs), which deal with several markets and perform a broad range of tasks (e.g. 
they suggest lines of conduct on services provision, they avoid by-passing by non 
regulated utilities, they rule on environmental issues and so forth) among which 
the most important is the regulation of prices.
2 Regulated firms are not allowed to 
receive governmental subsides and their revenue must cover their costs (including 
managerial  rewards).  IOUs  charge  a  two-part  tariff,  triggering  rate  reviews  in 
response  to  rising  costs.  Even  if  dockets  can  be  directly  entrusted  to  a 
commissioner  or  to  an  Administrative  Law  Judge  (ALJ),  almost  all  the  files 
follow  a  precise  hierarchical  trial  routine  composed  of  two  levels  of  formal 
hearings  open  to  all  the  interested  parties  (firms,  ratepayers,  lawyers  of  the 
Attorney General’s Office). In the first instance, commissioners sit on the bench 
and  consumer  advocates
3  represent  ratepayers.  If  the  proposed  filing  is  not 
approved,  a  formal  quasi-judicial  hearing,  presided  by  one  or  more  ALJs,  is 
opened  and  the  quasi-judicial  tribunal  takes  a  qualified  majority  enforceable 
judgment. PUCs may review the case, provided that the onus of injustice and 
illegality of the decision lies on the firm. Finally, utilities can also appeal to High 
Courts on formal issues. These two last appeal levels are rarely granted. ALJs and 
commissioners are either elected or appointed and, during the hearings, their role 
is one of supervision: they examine witnesses and experts, receive the evidence 
                                                 
2 Here I follow the descriptions contained in the 1992 and 1997 Sunset Review of the Colorado 
PUC and in the Washington Utilities and Transportation Commission (WUTC) official website.  
3 Consumer advocates are state-funded independent bodies established during the 70s and 80s in 
the face of steeply rising rates in order to allow even residential users to proceed before PUCs.    6 
and  interpret  precedents  and  regulations.  The  final  motion  to  be  approved  is 
proposed by the PUC’s staff. This body is divided in a “trial” and in an “advisory” 
team. While the latter reviews the case formulating a staff position in all equated 
to the one of any other interested party; the former advices regulators and judges 
on  policy  issues  proposing  de  facto  the  motion.  The  complete  record  of  the 
hearings and the participation of all parties assure that the staff may consider only 
the available “hard” evidence. This is a by-product of the “adversary” nature of 
the hearings: no evidence can be denied once the precedent is individuated. Thus, 
the design of incentive schemes can be modelled through the following version of 
the Guerriero [2006, a]’s model. 
 
3. Theory 
The regulated firm produces a variable scale product q and it charges a two part 
tariff A + pq for q > 0, where A and p are positive.
4 Total cost is C = (β – a)q + υ 
and a represents the manager’s effort, while β is an inefficiency parameter, which 
turns out to be equal toβ  with probability v and toβ  with probability 1 – v, with 
∆β ≡ β  –β . Assuming that the fixed cost is known and normalizing it at zero (υ = 
0), it is possible to denote marginal cost as c ≡ β – a. Regulation is subject to both 
adverse selection (as captured by β) and moral hazard (as captured by a). Let me 
assume that effort remains strictly positive over the relevant range of equilibrium 
                                                 
4 As Joskow and Schmalensee [1986] suggest the fixed premium paid by consumers turns out to 
assume  the  some  role  of  the  governmental  transfers  typical  of  the  regulation-procurement 
literature. As a consequence, I will replace the economic shadow cost of public funds with the 
marginal deadweight loss associated with an increase in the fixed premium.   7 
production. If the manager exerts effort level a, she lowers the marginal cost of 
output by a, and incurs in a disutility (in monetary units) of ψ(a). This disutility is 
increasing and convex in a (i.e.: ψ ′>0; ψ ′′>0); moreover the following holds: 
ψ(0) = 0, lima →β ψ(a) = + ∞ and ψ ′′′>0.
5 Consumers have the same preferences; 
thus the demand is the one of a representative consumer with gross consumer 
surplus given by S(⋅). The inverse and regular demand functions and the firm’s 
revenue are given by p = P(q) = S ′(q), q = D(p), R(q) = P(q)q + A respectively. 
Consumers choose q as to maximize net surplus S(⋅) – A – pq and A is optimally 
fixed so as to make them indifferent between buying and not buying the good i.e., 
A  ≡  S(q)  –  P(q)q.  Firm’s  revenues  must  cover  average  costs  and  managerial 
compensation t (as underlined in section 2), i.e. A + (p – c)q(p) ≥ t. Both the firm 
and the supervisors are risk neutral with respect to income. The firm’s utility is 
given by U = t – ψ(a) and a reservation level of 0 is required. Let me denote the 
social surplus obtained producing q as V(q) with V(0) = 0, V ′ > 0 and V ′′< 0. 
V(q) is the sum of consumers’ net surplus plus the firm’s revenue evaluated at the 
shadow price of managerial reward λ and it rewrites as: 
V(q) = (S(q) – R(q)) + (1+λ)R(q) = S(q) +λR(q) = (1+λ)S(q).                                   
The planner’s objective function, labelled with subscript P, is: 
P W  = S(q(p)) – A – pq(p) + (1+λ) [A + (p – c) q(p) – t] + U =  
         = V(q) – (1+λ)[(β – a)q+ψ(a)] – λU                                                            (1) 
Here, 1+λ can be interpreted as the shadow price of the firm’s budget constraint. 
Under  complete  information,  the  planner  implements  the  first  best  allocation 
                                                 
5 This condition assures the concavity of the planner’s objective function and that the optimal 
incentive scheme is deterministic.   8 
through a simple “fixed price” (or cost target) contract leaving no rent to the firm 
(see  Appendix  6.1  for  details).
6  Instead,  under  asymmetric  information,  the 
planner observes only total cost and output
7 and not a: as a result, β is now private 
information of the firm. Label equilibrium rewards, outputs, total and marginal 
costs, utilities and effort for the two types as:  ( ) ( ) { } , , , , , , , , , , , . t q C c U a t q C c U a   
A contract based on the observables t and C specifies a reward-cost pair for each 
type. As usual, the program envisions a solution with binding low (inefficient) 
type’s individual rationality and high type’s incentive compatibility constraints: 
( ) 0 U t c ψ β = − − =                                                                                     (IR_L) 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) U t c U c c a ψ β ψ β ψ β = − − = + − − − = Φ                                 (IC_H) 
where Φ(·) is an increasing function defined as  ( ) ( ) ( ) a a a ψ ψ β Φ ≡ − − ∆ .
8 Such 
a solution entails an efficient level of effort and a positive informational rent U  
for the high type and under-effort and no rent for the low type. Now suppose that 
the planner can relax the informational asymmetry by employing a hierarchy of 
two supervisors (i.e. a regulator and a judge) designed to match the institutions 
described in section 2. The question is the following: is it possible to assess the ex 
post efficiency of the incentive schemes selected by a possibly partisan planner? 
                                                 
6 Under this regime, realized costs, outputs and prices are verifiable. The planner knows β and acts 
as a Stackelberg leader making take-or-live it offers on the observable a.  
7 With a linear technology, the planner observes average costs, which are equal to marginal cost. 
With know fixed cost υ, she observes (C – υ)/q = β – a and the analysis goes on unchanged. 
8 Incentive compatibility prescribes that the contract designed for typeβ  (β ) is the one preferred 
by type β  (β) in the menu of managerial rewards-cost pairs. This amounts to say that: 
( ) ( ) t c t c ψ β ψ β − − ≥ − −      (IC_H)     and       ( ) ( ) t c t c ψ β ψ β − − ≥ − −       (IC_L).   9 
As the following theory will make clear, the success of the regulatory regime 
design is sensible to technological and political dimensions. As follows I will treat 
the former underlining the main similarity with the Laffont and Tirole [1993]’s 
model, leaving the positive side of the issue to the next subsection. There I will 
compare the results with the seminal work of Laffont [1996].  
The analysis tracks the approach of Guerriero [2006, a]. Supervisors can, exerting 
costly effort, tailor the supervision activity to the specific docket (i.e., they choose 
the number and quality of the experts, the firms’ official papers to be examined 
and so forth). The equilibrium level of effort and the supervisors’ random ability 
(e.g., ability to examine witnesses and to understand precedents and prevailing 
regulations) determine the precision of the planner’s signal. As emphasized in 
section  2,  the  report  is  effectively  delivered  by  the  PUC’s  staff,  so  I  simply 
assume that the planner has directly at her disposal this benevolent information 
tool.
9 Besides, given that in the U.S. electricity market PUCs’ rules and conducts 
prohibit communication between supervisors, no side contract is allowed between 
these players. Once one of the two docket’s filing steps is set up, the planner 
receives a signal σ = {β ;φ } about the cost structure with precision ξ, determined 
by the supervisor’s activity. The information is hard, i.e. it is verifiable (in the 
sense that every interested party can convince himself that the signal corresponds 
to the true state of the world). If β = β  with probability ξ the planner sees σ =  β  
and implements the complete information contract and with probability 1 – ξ she 
observes  σ  =φ .  If  β  =β ,  then  σ  =  φ   always.  When  σ  =  φ ,  the  planner  is 
                                                 
9 Besides the constraints imposed by the adversarial trial structure, explicit incentives can be 
designed for staff’s members, who are not implicitly motivated by any appointment rule.   10 
uninformed, and she updates her beliefs applying Bayes rule.
10 Supervisors are 
evaluated according to the performance ξ  ∈ [0, 1], which is described by the 
docket’s records and is generated by a combination of effort e and random ability 
α as ξ = αe + e; e takes value on (0,  u ξ /2] with ( ) 0,1
u ξ ∈ and the effort’s cost 
function writes as  ( ) ( )(1 ) C e C e K = − ￿
￿
 where  ) 0, K K  ∈  measures the effectiveness 
of the signal extraction technology. K is increasing in the PUC’s resources and in 
the watchdog groups’ ability to provide hard information. Suppose that:  0 e C >
￿
, 
0 ee C >
￿








. Thus, the full precision case is ruled out and it is 
not possible to obtain a precision of  u ξ  through effort only. The random ability α 
has support (0, 1). Without loss of generality,
11 suppose that α ~ Beta (g, b) with 
density  fy(y; g, b) = [y
g–1(1 – y)
b–1]/B(g, b) and B(g, b) =
1 1 1
0 (1 )
g b y y dy
− − − ∫  (the 
Beta function). The mean is  α  = g/(g + b). If g = b = 1, I obtain a uniform 
distribution  on  (0,  1):  from  a  Bayesian  point  of  view,  this  is  the  case  of 
uninformative prior on the supervisors’ ability. The mild restrictions I impose on 
g and b are such that the distribution of α is symmetric (g = b), which can be 
relaxed and hump-shaped (informative), i.e. g > 1 and b > 1.
12 If either e or ξ are 
verifiable or contractible, “selling the store” contracts reach efficiency; but the 
                                                 
10 This technology simplifies the notation and has the appealing feature that the agent can provide 
verifiable information only when the proof is possible: low cost case (see also Laffont [2000]). 
11 Indeed, all the theoretical results continue to hold if one of the other continuous non degenerate 
distributions  supported  on  a  bounded  interval  (i.e.:  Triangular,  Kumaraswamy,  Logarithmic, 
Uniform) is employed (see also footnote 13). Among these, the Beta function is the most versatile. 
12 Here, α and e assume the meaning of overall measures: they take into account the different 
judges’ and regulators’ abilities. For sake of comparison I will exhibit the case of equal draw of α.   11 
assumption that the planner can write unrestricted contingent contracts with the 
supervisors  does  not  fit  in  any  way  reality  and  so  I  assume  that  ξ  is  always 
observable but not contractible. The timing of the game is given as follows: 
1. Society (planner, firm, regulator and judge if addressed; see stage 3. and 4. 
below) learns the nature of the regulatory environment: P(q) and that { } , β β β ∈ . 
Next the firm discovers the only piece of private information: β. 
2.  The  planner  offers  a  menu  of  managerial  reward-cost  pairs  to  the  firm 
contingent to the realization of the eventual signals obtained through the hearing 
process. An exogenously given wage s, set at the reservation level  ˆ s (assumed 
equal for both judges and regulators), is given to the two supervisors.  
3. The regulator chooses her level of effort; next she discovers her random ability 
and, at last, the planner receives the first signal. If this is informative the first best 
is implemented; otherwise a hearing is open and the judge is asked to rule it.  
4. Step 3. is repeated for the judge. If the signal is uninformative, the planner asks 
to the firm to report its marginal cost (asymmetric information regime). 
5. The firm exerts the chosen cost-reducing effort and a reward-quantity pair is 
implemented.  Finally,  supervisors’  evaluators  make  their  move.  Note  that  for 
elected supervisor the evaluator will be a rational electorate; while for appointed 
ones she is a politician or a selection committee. 
Supervisors face different incentives as a function of the nature of the task and of 
the selection rule. The two dimensions of heterogeneity (regulators vs. judges and 
appointed  vs.  elected  officials)  are  captured  by  the  indexes  i  =  {Appointed, 
Elected} and l = {Regulator, Judge}. The supervisors’ utility function is given by:  
{ } , , , , ˆ ( , ) 1 (1 ) ( ) (1 (1 ) ) ( )
i
i l i l i l i l R e S SR H e S J C e s τ   = + − − − −  
￿                                      (2)   12 
In equation (2), S is equal to 1 for a regulator and to 0 for a judge and τ measures 
the strength of the career concerns.  ( ) ,
i
i l H e  differentiates elected and appointed 
supervisors (here my reference is the Alesina and Tabellini [2005, a]’s model). 
Elected ones want to be re-elected and this happens if  , E l ξ  exceeds a threshold 
, E l ξ . This means that  ( ) { } , , , Pr
E
E l E l E l H e ξ ξ = ≥ . Voters are rational in the sense 
that they understand that the alternative to the incumbent is another politician 
with average talent who will achieve a precision 
exp
, , (3/2) E l E l e ξ =  (where the apex 
exp refers to the voters’ expectation). Therefore, it follows that:  ( ) { , Pr
E
E l H e α = ≥  
( ) }
exp
, , 3 /2 1 E l E l e e   ≥ −   . Appointed supervisors are career concerned and they want to 
maximize the conditional perception of their ability. Employing E(·) (or, with a 
slight abuse of notation, the apex exp) to indicate the evaluator’s expectation over 
α given the performance realization and E to label the unconditional expectation 
over  , A l ξ . It follows that  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) { }
exp exp
, , , , , E 1 /
A
A l A l A l A l A l H e E E e e e α ξ α   = = + −    and a 
glance at  ( )
E H i  and ( )
A H i  reveals how elected supervisors will exert more effort 
than  appointed  ones.
13  Finally  in  (2)  R  and  J  represent  regulators  and  judges 
specific parameters. They are defined on (0, 1). R captures the “revolving-door” 
effect - regulators are attracted by job opportunities in the regulated industry - 
                                                 
13 In fact, the density of the Beta evaluated at the mean is always greater than 1 for all g and b 
greater than 1. The relevant inequality (i.e., fα(α ) > 1) remains true for g ≠ b (asymmetric Beta) 
and for all the other continuous distributions supported on a bounded interval (except for the 
uninformative prior/uniform case when it holds as equality) when the hump-shape property is 
imposed. Proofs are available upon request. The result becomes local for imperfect substitutability 
between e and α (ξ = (α + Z)e). Here, I need: [Z + g/(g+b)] fα(α ) > [1 + Zg/(g+b)].   13 
while J formalizes the judges’ desire to leave a legacy of correctness (see Levy 
[2005] for a similar treatment). The revolving door effect does not exist for ALJs. 
In order to solve the model, I proceed by backward induction considering first the 
supervisors’ effort choice and then the mechanism design problem faced by the 
planner. The correct equilibrium concept is perfect Bayesian equilibrium. 
Equilibrium levels of effort can be ranked as follows:  , , ˆ ˆ E J A J e e >  and  , , ˆ ˆ E R A R e e >  
(see Guerriero [2006 a] for a proof). These levels are greater the more efficient 
the  supervision  technology  (higher  K)  is.  At  stage  2.  the  planner  foresees  the 
supervisors’ moves and offers to the firm a menu of contracts contingent on the 
eventual  signals  {σR,  σJ}  and  fully  characterized  by  the  equilibrium  levels  of 
effort.  The  planner’s  posterior  belief  on  β  =β   is:  Pr( / , ) R J β β σ φ σ φ = = = = 
, , , , ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ (1 ( , )) (1 ( , )) i R i J i R i J v e e v e e γ γ = − − . Note how the expected ex ante probability that 
the  planner  receives  at  least  one  informative  signal  { , , , , ˆ ˆ ˆ ( , ) [ ( )] i R i J i R i R e e E e γ ξ ≡ +  
} , , , , ˆ ˆ (1 [ ( )]) [ ( )] i R i R i J i J E e E e ξ ξ + −  will be greater the higher K is and if supervisors are 
elected. Define µ as the shadow cost of public funds. In the supervision regime 
(note the apex S), the planner’s ex-post expected welfare function writes as: 
( ) , , , *
, , , ,
, ,
ˆ ˆ 1 ( , )
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ( , ) 1 ( , ) ( ) (1 ) ( ) ( )
ˆ ˆ 1 ( , )
i R i J AI S S S S S
P i R i J i R i J
i R i J
v e e
W v e e W v e e V q a q a
v e e
γ
γ γ λ β ψ
γ
 −       = + − − + − + +       −  
 
                       
, ,
1 ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ( ) ( ) (1 ) ( ) ( ) 2(1 )
ˆ ˆ 1 ( , )
S S S S S
i R i J
v
a V q a q a s
v e e
λ λ β ψ µ
γ
 −       − Φ + − + − + − +       −  
.      (3) 
As usual, only the low type’s allocation-effort pair is distorted and I have that: 
* ˆ ˆ ( )
S S q q a β = −      i.e.,        ( ) ˆ ˆ ˆ ,
S S S V q c a β ′ = = −  
( ) ( )( )( ) , , ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ 1 1 1 ( , ) ( )
S S S
i R i J a q v v e e a ψ λ λ γ ′ ′ = − + − − Φ .                       (4)  
In equation (4), the rule giving price as a function of marginal cost is the same of   14 
the full information case: incentive concerns are entirely taken care of by the cost-
reimbursement rule. In order to lower the high type rent, the planner is forced to 
distort the low type’s allocation away from the first best and towards low powered 
(smaller  ˆ S a ) incentive schemes. A more efficient signal extraction technology 
curbs  such  a  distortion;  moreover,  implicit  political  incentives  (election)  for 
supervisors act as substitute for costly explicit market incentives (COS) for the 
regulated firm. The following proposition summarizes these findings: 
Proposition 1: A. High powered incentive schemes are linked to the presence of 
elected supervisors and more efficient supervision technologies (higher K). B. An 
increase in the power of the incentive scheme lowers ex-ante regulated prices. 
Proposition 1 extends the New Regulation Theory’s (Laffont and Tirole [1993]) 
insights to the more realistic framework with implicitly interested supervisors. At 
this point, it is instructive to stress that the picture drawn in this section is at least 
partially  shaded.  I  assumed  a  myopic  and  public  interested  planner,  but  what 
happens when concerns for the long run firm’s profitability appear on the scene? 
 
3.1 Strategic Price Mechanisms Reforms 
Following Laffont and Tirole [1993], a sharp tension between rent extraction and 
investments arises in industrial policies: whether or not the planner can commit to 
a  contract  contingent  on  the  level  of  investments,  equilibrium  allocations  can 
envision ex post expropriation of sunk investments. In this sense, non-benevolent 
supervisors may relax such a time inconsistency. The intuition proposes several 
new  questions:  is  it  possible  to  think  of  the  supervisors’  effort  exertion  as  a 
pandering  activity  when  investments  are  taken  into  consideration?  How  much 
partisan  planners  care  about  investment’s  decision  by  the  regulated  firm  in   15 
selecting  incentive  schemes?  How  much  is  this  choice  driven  by  efficiency 
evaluations and how strong are the rent seeking forces? A first set of answers 
arise naturally when the above model is bridged to the parallel analysis in Laffont 
and Tirole [1993]. Before stage 1., the firm fixes the level of a non contractible 
investment of cost I that increases of ζ(I) the probability that a high type is drawn. 
Assume  that 
1( )
( ) 0, ( ) 0, lim , (1 )/
I v




′ ′′ > < = ∞ = − i i   and  ( ) 1 ( ) v ζ θ ′ > ∆ i   (i.e., 
investments are effective enough). The planner lacks commitment but anticipates 
the optimal I (i.e., I
*). In the investment regime (note the additional apex I), ex 
ante the firm maximizes its expected ex post rent minus investment costs: 
{ }
* , *
0 , , ˆ ˆ ˆ argmax (1 ( ))[1 ( , )] ( ( ))
S I
I i R i J I v I e e a I I ζ γ ≥ ∈ + − Φ −                                      (5) 
The firm underinvests with respect to the social optimum (see Appendix 6.2 for a 
revealed preference argument) and a glance at expression (5) suggests that the 
extent of inefficiency is higher the more precise the planner’s signal is and the 
less powered the incentive scheme is.
14 Fixed-price contracts reach efficiency but 
leave a disproportionately high rent to the high type. So the supervisors’ signal 
extraction activity can assume a pandering feature when effort is driven more by 
career  concerns  than  by  a  farsighted  interest  in  the  market’s  efficiency  and  a 
planner caring enough about cost-reducing investments, because faced with a high 
cost market, prefers a high-powered rules. The following proposition summarizes: 
Proposition 2: Investment-concerned planners prefer higher powered incentive 
rules if faced with high cost industries. 
                                                 
14 A similar effect is studied in Sappington [1986] who shows how an institution preventing the 
regulator from observing the firm’s true cost is optimal when investments’ expropriation is a real 
concern. Here, PBRs and the appointment rule for supervisors cover the same role.   16 
This  inefficiency  is  even  stronger  when  investments  are  directed  towards 
reliability and quality services. In fact, these activities do not lower the firm’s cost 
but increase its long run profits: evidently also a conflict between consumers’ 
groups  arises  here.  To  capture  this,  I  assume  that the  constitutional  reform  is 
decided  by  the  incumbent  among  two  parties:  one  more  pro-shareholders  R 
(Republican) and one more pro-consumers D (Democratic). Between stages 1. 
and 2., each party faces an election with winning probability xj (j = [D, R]) and 
decides,  if  it  is  the  winner,  the  size  of  ρj,  an  instrument  increasing  the 
investment’s utility for the firm ( ˆ ( , ) j G I ρ ). A type j planner attaches a weight J χ ￿  
to  ( ) G i  and a weight χj to  ( ) G i . The weights are such that 1 2 R d χ = + ,  1 D d χ = + , 
2 1 R d χ = − ￿ ,  1 R d χ = − ￿   where  d λ >   represents  the  extent  of  party  policy 
differences. A Republican planner values more I and dislikes less an increase in 
the firm’s rent. Define
* , ˆ ˆ ( ( ), ) ( , )
S I
j I a i I i j ρ ≡ . The firm is risk averse towards non 
cost-reducing investments and the following holds: 
1 11 11 2 22 12 21 111 112 11 12 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, G G G G G G G G G G G > < < > < > > ≥ and 
, ,
11 11 ˆ ˆ ( ( , ), ) ( , ) ( ( , ), ) ( , ) 1
S I S I
j j G I i R I i R a G I i D I i D a ρ ρ     ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ≥           (6) 
Before stage 3., the firm chooses the non-observable and non-contractible I as to 
maximize its expected ex post utility subject to the budget constraint: 
{ }
* ,
0 ˆ ˆ ˆ argmax ( , ) ( ) . .: ( )
S I
I j I G I t a st A p c q t I ρ ψ ≥ + − + − ≥ + .                                       (7) 
I
* is a function of the incentive scheme’s power and of both ρj and d. The optimal 
ρj is such that  ˆ ˆ R D ρ ρ > . It follows that: 
* , * ,
1 1 ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ( , ) ( , ) 0
S I S I
R D I a I a ρ ρ ≥ ≥ . Let me focus 
on regimes in which supervisors share the same selection rule and define: 
                          , , ˆ ˆ ( , ) ( ) i R i J e e i γ γ ≡ ;               
* * * ( , ) ( , ) ( ( , ) ( , )) j I i j I i j x I i j I i j ≡ − + − − ￿ ;   17 
                     
* ˆ ( ( , ), ) ( , ) j G I i j G i j ρ ≡ ;            ( , ) ( , ) ( ( , ) ( , )) j G i j G i j x G i j G i j ≡ − + − − ￿   
and ο as the shadow price of the moral hazard in investment constraint (first order 
condition of (7)). A type j planner’s ex post expected welfare function writes as: 
( )
, , , ( , ) ( ) ( ) (1 ) ( , ) ( 1 ) ( , ) 1 ( , )
AI S I AI S
j P j j W i j W i v i G i j I i j G i j I γ λ χ χ λ ο   = + + + + − − − −∂ ∂  
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ . 
On top of it, the low type’s equilibrium effort is given by:   ( )
, ˆ S I a ψ ′ =  
         ( ) {
, , , 1 1 ˆ ˆ ( ) (1 ) ( , )
1 1
S I S I S I
j q v i a G i j a
v
γ λ λ χ
λ
 ′ = − Φ − + + ∂ ∂ +  + −
￿ ￿  
                   }
, 2 , ( 1 ) ( , ) ( , )
S I S I
j I i j a G i j I a χ λ ο    − − − ∂ ∂ + ∂ ∂ ∂   
￿ ￿ .             (8) 
Non  contractibility  of  investment  along  with  a  sharp  conflict  among  different 
consumer groups generates the last three positive terms in the cost-reimbursement 
rule. These terms are affected by both the party policy distance d and the holding 
on power xj: partisan planners will take into account the political uncertainty and 
select  the  power  of  the  incentive  scheme  according  to  the  consequences  that 
expropriation has on their constituency.
15  The straightforward comparative statics 
of equation (8) with respect to { }
, , , j j D R d x J
=
 implies the following patterns: 
Proposition 3: A. The likelihood of a reform towards more powerful incentive 
schemes is higher the larger party policy differences are and the higher (lower) 
the holding on power is if the reformer is Republican (Democratic). B. Higher 
powered incentive schemes are more likely if the reformer is Republican.  
Such a strategic institutional design explanation extends to the incentive schemes’ 
reform the intuition suggested by Guerriero [2006 a] for the supervisors’ selection 
                                                 
15 Several studies demonstrate that a lack of permanence in office can inspire policymakers to 
implement institutional reforms either to influence political outcomes or to impose constraints on 
future incumbents (see Persson and Svensson [1988] and Tabellini and Alesina [1990]).   18 
rules constitutional reforms. It is worth to emphasize how sharp is the difference 
of these results compared with the seminal analysis in Laffont [1996]. There the 
relation between PBRs reforms and the holding on power was negative when the 
incumbent  reformer  is  Republican  and  null  when  the  reformer  is  Democratic. 
Clearly enough, when high powered schemes leave positive rents in equilibrium, 
new resources are in the hands of the regulated firm and the fear of supervisors’ 
capture becomes a real concern. To this extent, the following section proposes a 
few interesting remarks about the impact on the above model of the action of an 
organized group interested in maximizing the regulated firm’s rent. 
 
3.2 Robustness: Lobbying and Bribing 
Both ALJs and PUC’s commissioners exert effort in other tasks. As seen above, 
examples are the control of bypassing by non-regulated utilities and the analysis 
of environmental regulation. The organized group want to relax the supervision 
constraint offering side-contracts conditional on this second effort level supposed 
(as in Alesina and Tabellini [2005 a]) observable and contractible.
16 The interest 
group has all the bargaining power and influences supervisors, one at the time, 
either  directly  (bribes)  or  indirectly  (campaign  contributions)  just  before  the 
supervision effort is decided in stages 3. or in 4.. Let me assume that the level of 
performance from the extra task h brings a small positive extra-utility to the firm 
but implies a relevant cost (in terms of effort) to the supervisor (i.e., the effort 
cost function  ( ) , ,
h
i l i l C e e +  is non-divisible). It turns out that in a jointly optimal 
                                                 
16 Here I take aside the eventual multiple principals-multiple agents’ strategic interaction, i.e. cost 
minimization across supervisors’ side payments.  This remains as open agenda for future research.   19 
equilibrium  , ˆ 0 i l e =  so that the high type’s firm enjoys a higher informational rent 
(proofs  are  available  upon  request).  Even  if  discouraging,  these  equilibria  are 
fragile and the following remarks apply: 1 Bribes do not arise if the punishment 
that a supervisor receives if caught is high enough; 2 Campaign contributions, 
although legal, would be not even affordable for the interest group, which has to 
reimburse supervisors for the entire amount of implicit incentives (this is due to 
the precision’s multiplicative technology). Thus, provided that implicit incentives 
are strong enough (i.e., high enough values of τ, R and J in (2)) the model remains 
robust to the introduction of lobbying and bribing. At this point, the other main 
contribution of the paper is to face the model with U.S. electricity market’s data. 
 
4.  Evidence 
The  empirical  questions  I  want  to  answer  are:  what  forces  have  significantly 
shaped the reforming planners’ incentives at the constitutional tables? How strong 
were the political positions and how relevant the efficiency reasons? Can the data 
reveal  the  extent  of  substitutability  between  market  and  political  institutions?  
What  is  the  relation  between  PBRs  reforms,  considered  as  endogenous,  and 
regulated prices? Based on the theoretical propositions, the following Empirical 
Predictions formulates such questions as testable empirical predictions:  
Empirical Predictions: 1. A. High powered incentive schemes are linked to more 
efficient supervision technologies, high cost industries and elected supervisors. B. 
High powered incentive schemes are more likely with Republican reformers the 
larger party policy differences are and the higher (lower) the incumbent holding 
on power is if the reforming party is Republican (Democratic).   20 
2. High powered incentive schemes lower the level of equilibrium prices.  
While Table 1 reports variables’ names and construction, Table 2.A and 2.B show 
how, between 1982 and 2002, 41 of the 144 major IOUs operating in the US 
electric power market switched to some kind of PBRs. This enormous wave of 
reforms has interested 25 of the 49 continental US states and represents a perfect 
source of variation for a panel analysis. Besides, following Persson and Tabellini 
[2003], another justification to a panel approach is that cross sectional models 
would deliver fragile inference given the “non-random pattern of constitutional 
reforms and the extensive differences among [individuals] belonging to different 
constitutional  groups.”  Therefore,  I  will  make  use  of  two  main  models  for 
evaluating points 1. and 2. (respectively) of the Empirical Predictions: a random 
effects logit with dependent variable a performance-based regulation dummy and 
a panel pass-trough pricing equation. 
 
4.1 Non Random Constitution Selection 
First  of  all,  let  me  define  institutions.  The  high  powered  incentive  schemes’ 
dummy (PBR_F and PBR) takes value 1 if the firm (or at least one firm within the 
state) adopts a broadly defined performance based regulation (rate freeze, price or 
revenue cap with possible earnings sharing)
17 and 0 otherwise (COS).  To capture 
the power of the supervisors’ implicit incentives, the party policy differences and 
the efficiency of the production and signal extraction technologies, I will make 
use of several proxies. Implicit incentives are captured by Jud_Elec (an elected 
judges’ dummy) and Reg_Elec (an elected regulators’ binary). The party policy 
                                                 
17 See Sappington et al. [2001] for a definition of each scheme.   21 
distance is measured by the absolute difference in the percentage of seats held by 
Democrats and Republicans (Av_Dist); while the average percentage of seats held 
by the majority party (Av_Maj) is the proxy chosen for the incumbent’s holding 
on  power  (see  Hanssen  [2004,  b]).  Creating  a  proxy for  the  efficiency  of  the 
supervision technology is a more complex task. My strategy is to use the two sets 
of observables that more likely enhance the likelihood of information extraction: 
proxies  for  the  presence  of  powerful  watchdog  groups  and  measures  of  the 
amount of staff’s resources. The first group includes: Young (proportion aged 5-
17), Ind and Res (proportion of revenues form sales to industrial and residential 
users respectively). The second set is composed by Budget (PUC’s staff budget) 
and Employ (the number of permanent staff’s members). The latter, unfortunately, 
is a very crude measure for efficiency. Varied  and unobservable (in my  data) 
skills are required to the PUC’s members so it is not clear if higher values of 
Employ  assure  a  more  precise  signal  or  instead  relax  the  assumed  staff’s 
benevolence.  Investments’  concerns  are  reasonably  linked  to  costly  generation 
(cst) and more crudely to high residential prices (Rkhr). Generations by nuclear 
and fuel sources (Gen_Fuel, Gen_Nucl) are introduced (one at the time to avoid 
multicollinearity)  in  the  specification  in  order  to  control  for  difference  in 
generation  sources  and  federal  policies  across  states.  Other  controls  are  state 
population (Pop), income (Income) and electricity sales (Sales). Columns (1) and 
(2)  of  Table  3  reproduce  the  estimates  of  a  random  effect  Logit  model  with 
dependent variable PBR for a panel of 49 states over the samples 1970-1997 and 
1980-1997. This second breakdown shows how the results are affected when the 
Embargo shocks years are excluded. Moreover, column (3) reports the estimates 
when the same model is ran for a panel of 143 firms located in the same 49 states   22 
over the 1980-1997 period. Here, the right hand side variables vary only across 
states  and  time:  identification  is  obtained  through  the  firms  specific  random 
effects. The evidence strongly supports the model’s predictions. For what concern 
the proxies for the holding on power, the results clearly lean towards the strategic 
use  explanation:  the  holding  on  power  increases  the  probability
18  of  the 
introduction of PBRs if interacted with Rep while the sign of Av_Maj is negative 
within the Democratic incumbents’ group. Republican incumbent are more likely 
to introduce PBRs.
19 All the proxies are generally highly significant. A bit more 
mixed is the evidence on the efficiency of the signal extraction technology. The 
relevant proxies show the correct sign except Employ always negative and Res 
and Ind negative in columns (2) and (3). While the first sign comes at no surprise 
given the above remark, an appealing explanation for the last two is that, in a 
dynamic  set  up,  the  friction  between  supervisors  and  interested  parties  would 
become so sour to deteriorate the quality of the signal. Finally, high marginal 
costs  (investment  concerns)  increase  the  attractiveness  of  high  powered  cost-
reimbursement  rules.  All  these  findings  are  insensible  to  the  sample  choice. 
Finally,  looking  at  selection  rules,  it  is  clear  (even  if  Jud_Elec  is  negative  in 
column (2)) how the planner tends to substitute costly rent-extraction incentives 
(COS)  with  accountability-driving  institutions.  The  regulators  selection  rule 
seems  to  cover  a  more  relevant  role  in  such  a  substitution  pattern.  The 
                                                 
18 To be precise, each coefficient reported in columns (1)-(3) measures the effect on the logarithm 
of the odds ratio (for the event PBR ) of a unit increase in one of the right hand side variables.  
19 The impact of an incumbent Republican reformer is given by the sum of the coefficient on Rep 
plus the coefficient on PBR*Rep multiplied for the mean of Rep. In columns (1) and (3) these 
figures are respectively: 4.26 = – 25.54 + 44.48*0.67 and 3.46 = – 18.839 + 34.836*0.64.    23 
consideration of the reforms’ timing as dependent variable confirms this finding.
20 
Column (4) shows the estimates of an exponential proportional hazards model 
with failure event identified by PBR_F. Jud_Elec is negative and not statistically 
significant. All the other points of the Empirical Predictions continue to hold. In 
interpreting column (4)‘s figures, remember that the effect of a unit increase in 
one of the right hand side variables (say cst) is to increase the hazard of PBR_F 
(i.e., the instantaneous probability of a reform given that COS was in place) by a 
factor  equal  to  the  exponential  of  the  estimated  coefficient  attached  to  that 
variable (i.e., exp(1.064)).
21 At this point, a natural question arises: what are the 
effects of PBRs’ reforms on regulatory performances (i.e., prices)?  
 
4.2 Pricing Models  
Recent cross-states empirical analyses, mainly based on telecommunications data, 
have delivered the following stylized facts: PBRs assure lower prices and higher 
earnings  with  no  relevant  reduction  in  overall  service  quality.
22  What  this 
literature  lacks  is  an  endogenous  treatment  of  the  regulatory  institutions:  as 
follows I will fill this hole. The specification relates electricity prices charged at 
                                                 
20 However, the log-rank test significantly (at 5%) rejects the equality of the survivor functions 
across electing and appointing groups for both selection rule breakdowns. 
21 The results are not sensible to the specific parametric form imposed to the underlying hazard 
function. Besides, the Cox proportional hazards model delivers a very similar output. 
22 See Sappington et al. [2001] and Kridel et al. [1996] for complete reviews of the empirical 
literature.  Hill  [1995]’s  and  Joskow  [2006]’s  reviews  focus  on  electric  power  market  studies. 
Recently  a  wide  cross-countries  literature  has  been  interested  in  the  relative  performances  of 
benchmarking techniques applied to electric utilities (see Jamasb and Pollitt [2000]).   24 
state level to various cost items plus fixed effect terms for regulatory regimes. 
Utilities  set  prices  at  system  wide  average  costs  and  the  more  considerable 
component of such costs is the fossil fuels’ item. The latter is useful in assessing 
the  pass-through  of  cost  shocks  into  prices  and  it  helps  in  controlling  the 
differences in the production structures. Therefore, I test point 2. of the Empirical 
Predictions running, for each customer class, the following panel regressions: 
, 1 , 2 , 3 , _ _ s t s t s t s t s t p Reg Elec Jud Elec PBR η ϑ φ φ φ = + + + + +     
                      1 , , 2 , , 3 , , , _ s t s t s t s t s t s t s t PBR c Jud Elec c c Con υ υ υ ϕ ε + + + + + .                      (9) 
In equation  (9)  , s t p  is a price for state s in  year t;  s η  are state fixed effects 
controlling for long-run differences in production and distribution systems;  t ϑ  are 
year dummies picking up macro-shocks and common changes in federal policy; 
, s t Con   includes  state  specific  time  varying  controls  (Gen_Fuel,  Gen_Nucl, 
Income,  Income
2,  Pop,  Pop
2,  Sales)  and  proxies  for  the  efficiency  of  the 
supervision technology (Res, Ind, Young, Budget, Employ).  , s t PBR ,  , _ s t Jud Elec  
and  , _ s t Reg Elec represent the time varying dummies for PBRs and election rules 
respectively.  Table  4  reports  the  main  figures.  The  model  has  always  an 
explanatory power higher than 85% and all the proxies for the efficiency of the 
supervision technology (not shown) are highly significant and generally have an 
attached coefficient with the correct sign. When , _ s t Jud Elec  is included, fossil 
fuels’ costs interacted with  , s t PBR  have always a negative but never significant 
marginal  effect.  The  high  significance  of  , _ s t Jud Elec   suggests  that  implicit 
political  incentives  are  more  effective:  this  would  also  offer  an  appealing 
justification to the lags in the introduction of PBRs in the U.S.. The direct effect   25 
of  , s t PBR  is both significant  and positive on residential and commercial  rates. 
Given the endogeneity of cost-reimbursement rules (see section 4.1), can these 
results be driven by a failure in conditional independence? Table 5 addresses such 
a question. Here, (9) is estimated with the Arellano-Bond procedure without fixed 
effects but with one lag of the dependent variable; Av_Maj, Rep, Av_Maj*Rep 
only  are  employed  as  extra  instruments  to  avoid  weak  instrumentation.  As 
columns (1), (2) and (3) show the indirect effect of  , s t PBR  is not significant but 
now  null;  the  direct  effect  becomes  negative:  OLS  seems  to  overestimate  the 
overall  impact  of  the  reform  towards  more  powerful  schemes.  This  has  a 
significant (at 10%) direct marginal negative effect on residential prices implying 
a  2.5%  reduction  on  residential  bills  over  the  1970-1997  sample.  The  weak 
significance is mainly due to the presence of the first lag of prices. Finally, note 
that the over-identifying restrictions are never rejected. 
 
5.  Concluding Remarks 
As the theoretic section explains price-cap and COS arbitrate the rent extraction-
efficiency trade-off in different ways. Partisan planners not only take into account 
the  comparative  advantages  of  different  rules  but  they  also  use  high  powered 
schemes to strategically tie the hands of new incumbents’ parties.  I test these 
propositions on a panel of U.S. states. The results show how the probability of a 
reform from a low powered incentive scheme to a higher powered one has been 
linked  to  Republican  incumbents,  larger  party  policy  differences,  high  cost 
industry structures, the presence of a more efficient supervision technology and 
elected supervisors. This evidence is robust to different estimation procedures and   26 
to the consideration of the reforms timing as dependent variable. Less clear are 
the  findings  concerning  the  relation  between  regulated  prices  and  PBRs.  OLS 
overestimate  the  negative  marginal  effect  of  the  reform,  which  is  statistically 
significant for residential rates only. Such a point remains as open agenda for 
future studies on the field along with a multidimensional analysis of differently 
powered incentive rules.
23 All in all, the empirical section rationalizes the great 
wave of change that has interested the market during the last decades and shows 
how, at the constitutional table, partisan planners have substituted, according to 
their  own  partisan  interests,  explicit  market’s  incentives  (COS)  with  implicit 
accountability ones (election).  
On top of it, my analysis delivers three main points to be seriously considered by 
actual constitutional designers: 1. the importance of a careful assessment of the 
benefits  linked  to  high  powered  incentive  schemes  when  expropriation  of 
investment is a real concern; 2. the relevance of a deep evaluation of the effective 
efficiency  of  the  signal  extraction  technology  (i.e.,  extent  of  participation  of 
watchdog groups and regulatory agencies’ resources) when regulatory reforms are 
put in place; 3. the welfare gains related to a Constitutional table insulated from 
short-term  electoral  boosts  when  the  delicate  incentive  schemes-institutional 




                                                 
23 When I employ a multinomial Logit and an ordered Logit estimator, the main results remain 
unchanged. The dependent variable of the multinomial Logit is set equal to 1 if a COS regulation 
is employed, 3 if a pure price cap is in use and 2 if any other PBRs’ scheme is adopted.   27 
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6.1 Solution without Supervision and Investment Concerns 
Maximizing (1) with respect of U, e and q yields the following: 
1. The existence of the shadow cost of rewards implies no rent for the firm: 
U = 0                                      or                      t ≡ ψ(a*); 
2. The disutility of effort is equalized to the saving in average cost at the margin: 
ψ′ (a) = q*                        or                    a ≡ a*;                                   
3. The social marginal value and cost of output are equalized:  
V′ (q) = (1+λ) (β – a)              or              S′ (q) = p = c.         31 
A price–cap gives the right incentives for cost reduction and the fixed charge C* can be 
tailored to fully extract the firm’s rent. In such a “selling the store” mechanism, the price 
(PC stands for price cap) is implicitly defined as follows: 
t ≡ A + p
PCq(p
PC) – C(q(p
PC)) = S′ (q(·)) – C(q(·)) = d – (C(q(·)) – C*)  
where d = ψ(a*). The firm chooses a in order to maximize d – ((β – a)q – C*) – ψ(a ).
24■ 
 
6.2 Underinvestment When the Planner Cannot Commit 
The socially optimal ˆ I  minimizes the sum of investment costs and ex post costs: 
[ ] ˆ argmin (1 ( )) 1 (1 ( )) (1 ( )) I I I v I v I I v I ζ β ζ β β ζ β ∈ + + + − + = + − + ∆                         (10) 
This amounts to say that the objective in (10) assumes a value greater at I
* than at  ˆ I . 
Evidently, the same can be said for the objective function in (5). Once I sum these two 
inequalities, the following expression holds in equilibrium: 
* * * * *
, , ˆ ˆ (1 ( )) (1 ( ))[1 ( , )] ( ( )) i R i J I v I v I e e a I I β ζ β ζ γ + − + ∆ + + − Φ − ≥ 
 
*
, , ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ (1 ( )) (1 ( ))[1 ( , )] ( ( )) i R i J I v I v I e e a I I β ζ β ζ γ + − + ∆ + + − Φ −    
or  { }
* *
, , ˆ ˆ ˆ ( ( ) ( )) [1 ( , )] ( ( )) 0 i R i J v I I e e a I ζ ζ β γ − ∆ − − Φ ≥ . Given the properties of  ( ) ζ ′ i  and 
the first order condition of (5), this inequality is met for 
* ˆ ( ) ( ) I I ζ ζ ≥  or
* ˆ I I ≤ . If, as it 
is likely, the cost of investment is lower in low cost markets, Proposition 2 follows.    ■ 
 
6.3 Data 
This analysis exploits both cross sectional and time variation in the data. Three are the 
main data sets: a panel of 49 states for the samples 1970-1997 (1372 observations) and 
1980-1997 (888 observations) and a panel of 143 firms over the same 49 states over the 
period 1980-1997 (2574 observations). Nebraska has been excluded because it has no 
                                                 
24 Note that, as long as the planner knows β, she can infer effort from the observation of cost.     32 
investor–owned utilities while the District of Columbia (and consequently the Potomac 
Electric Power Company) is not considered because no data points are available before 
1987. Unbalanced panels deliver similar results. 
B.1 Data on incentive schemes are directly collected from:  
B.1.1 EEI, [2000], PBR Survey (Member Survey), EEI, Washington D.C. 
B.1.2 Sappington, D. E.M., J. P. Pfeifenberger, P. H. and G. N. Basheda, [2001]. 
B.2 Data on electric prices, generation and the price of fossil fuels (composite) per net 
Kwh are collected or calculated from the EEI (Edison Electric Institute) yearbook: 
EEI, [1995], 1960-1992: Historical Statistics of the Electric Utility Industry; 
EEI, [1993-1997], Statistical Yearbook of the Electric Utility Industry, Washington DC. 
EEI refers to the source of data for its yearbooks to various places including DOE, EIA, 
Federal Power Commission and FERC. EEI reports annual revenues (in dollar terms) and 
sales (in Kwh) by state and class of service. Prices are calculated from the revenues and 
sales in terms of cents per Kwh. Residential, commercial and industrial users account for 
the 95% of revenues. EEI reports electric generation and sources of energy for generation 
in two types of breakdown, i.e., by type of prime mover driving the generator and by 
energy source. The totals from the two of them are consistent. I used the second one. 
B.3 To construct the fossil fuel cost index for state i in year t, let sjit be the share of 
energy source j in state i in year t and let pit be the price of fossil fuels (composite) per net 
Kwh (in cents per Kwh) for state i in year t, calculated as:  pit  =  Σj (qjit/qit) pijt. Then the 
fossil fuel cost series will be given by cit = Σj sjit pit where sit is the share of electricity 
produced in state i in year t by the fossil fuel energy sources j (i.e.: coal, gas and oil). 
B.4 Data on regulatory selection rules, PUCs’ budgets and number of PUCs’ full time 
employees are collected directly from: 
NARUC, [1970-1997], Yearbook of Regulatory Agencies, NARUC, Washington DC. 
B.5 Political preferences are from the CSG (Council of State Governments) yearbooks: 
CSG, [1970-1997], The Book of the States, CSG, Lexington, KY.   33 
B.6  Data  on  judges’  selection  rule  and  length  terms  are  collected  from  Hanssen,  F. 
Andrew [2004, Table 1] and Besley, Timothy and A. Abigail Payne, [2003, Table 1].  
B.7 State income per capita, population, proportion aged over 65 and proportion aged 5-
17 are calculated from a U.S. Census Bureau (UCB) publication: 





Table 1: Variable Names and Descriptions. 




Dummy taking value 1 if the rule is in use in the state, 0 otherwise. 
(PBR_F = Dummy taking value 1 if the firm uses the rule, 0 
otherwise). 











Percentage of seats (averaged across upper and lower houses) held by 
majority party.  
 
Absolute difference between percentage of seats held by Democrats 
and Republicans. 
 





Dummy taking value 1 if commissioners are elected, 0 otherwise. 
 






PUC’s total receipts in thousands dollars.  
 










Percentage of population aged 65 and over. 
 
Percentage of population aged 5-17. 
 
Percentage of Sales from customers who are residential. 
 
Percentage of Sales from customers, which are industrial. 











Percentage of total generation from fossil fuels sources. 
 
Percentage of total generation from nuclear source. 
 
Sales in thousands Mwh. 
 
State population in thousands people. 
 
State income in thousands dollars.   34 
 
                    Table 2.A: PBR in the U.S. Electric Power Market (1970-2002). 
States  IOUs  PBR   Period 
AL  AL Po. Co. ;  Rate case moratorium;  1982-2002 
AZ  AZ Pu. Se. Co. ,  




AR  Entergy AR Inc. ;  None;   
CA 
Pacific Gas & El. Co. , 
San Diego Gas & El. Co. , * 
Southern CA Edison;* 
None, 
Revenue and price cap with earnings sharing (see also case A.98-01-014), 




CO  Pu. Se. Co. of CO;*  Rate case moratorium with earnings sharing (see also case 95A and 99A-531EG);   1996-2006 
CT 
Citizen Utilities Co. ,  
CT Light & Po. Co. ,* 
United Illuminating Co. ; 
None, 
Price cap (see also case 99-06-21 filed in 2000),  
None;   
 
2000-2001 
DE  Delmarva Po. & Light Co.;  None;   
DC  Potomac El. Po. Co.;  None;   
FL 
FL Po. & Light Co. , 
FL Po. Co. , 
Gulf Po. Co. , 









GA  GA Po. Co. , 




HI  HI El. ,* 
Maui El. Co. Ltd. ; 
Price cap with earnings sharing (see also case 96-0493 filed 1996), 
None; 
1997-1999 
ID  ID Po. Co. ;  None;   
IL 
Central IL Light Co. , 
Central IL Pu. Se. Co. ,* 
Commonwealth Edison Co. , 
IL Po. Co. , 
Mt. Carmel Pu. Se. Co. ; 
Price cap with earnings sharing, 
Price cap with earnings sharing,  
Price cap with earnings sharing, 
Price cap with earnings sharing, 







IN Michigan Po. Co. , 
Indianapolis Po. & Light Co. , 
Northern In. Pu.Se.Co. , 
PSI Energy Inc. , 








Interstate Po. Co. ,  
IES Ut. Inc. , 
MidAmerican Energy Co.;* 
None,  
None, 




KS  KS Gas & El.Co., 





KY.Po. Co. , 
KY Ut. Co. , 
Louisville Gas & El. Co. ,* 
Union Light Heat & Po. Co.; 
None, 
None, 






Central LA Inc. , 
Entergy LA Inc. ,* 
Entergy New Orleans Inc. , 
Southwestern El. Po. Co. ; 
None, 






Bangor Hydro-El. Co. , 
Central ME Po. Co. ,  
ME Pu. Se. Co. ;* 
Rate freeze for distribution services,  
Revenue-per-customer cap and price cap with earnings sharing,  




MD  Baltimore Gas & El. Co. ,* 
Potomac El. Co.;* 
Price cap (see also case 8794/8804 filed in 1998),  




Boston Edison Co. , 
Cambridge El. Light Co. , 
Commonwealth El. Co. , 
Eastern Edison Co. ,* 
Fitchburg Gas & El. Light Co. , 
MA El. Co. , 




Revenues sharing (see also case 96/94 filed in 1998),  
None,  
Rate freeze with earning sharing,  









Consumers Energy Co. , 
Detroit Edison Co. , 
Edison Sault El. Co. , 







MN Po. & Light Co., 
Northern State Po. Co. , 
Otter Tail  Po. Co.;* 
None,  
Price cap with earnings sharing, 




MS  Entergy MS Po. Co. ,* 
MS Po. Co.;* 
Benchmarks (see also case 93-UA-301 filed in 1994),  




Empire District  El. Co. , 
Kansas City Po. & Light Co. , 
St Joseph Light & Po. Co. , 
Union El. Co. ,* 










MT  MT Po. Co. ;*  Price cap with earnings sharing (see also D95.9.128 filed 1996);  1997-1998 
NV  NV Po. Co. ,  None;   
   35 
 
                Table 2.B: PBR in the U.S. Electric Power Market (1970-2002). 
States  IOUs  PBR   Period 
NV  Sierra Pacific Po. Co.;  None;   
NH  Pu. Se. Co. of NH;  None;   
NJ 
Atlantic City El. Co. , 
Jersey Central Po. & Light Co. , 
Pu. Se. El. & Gas Co. , 






NM  Pu. Se. Co. of NM;  None;   
NY 
Central Hudson Gas & El. Co. , 
Consolidated Edison Co.– NY Inc. ,  
Long Island Lighting Co. , 
NY State El. & Gas Co. ,* 
Niagara Mohawk Po. Co. ,* 
Orange & Rockland Utils Inc., 
Rochester Gas and El. Co.;* 
None, 
Revenue-per-customer cap with earnings sharing, 
None, 
Price-cap (for base rates) with earnings sharing (see also case 96-E-0891),  
Revenue cap and rate freeze- price cap, 
None,  









Carolina Po. & Light Co. , 
Duke Po. Co. , 





ND  MDU Resources Group Inc.;  None;   
OH 
Cincinnati Gas & El. Co. , 
Cleveland El. Illumination Co. , 
Columbus Southern Po. Co. , 
Dayton Po. & Light Co. , 
OH Edison Co. , 
OH Po. Co. , 









OK  OK Gas & El. Co. , 




OR  PacifiCorp ,* 
Portland General El. Co. ; 




Duquesne Light Co. , 
Metropolitan Edison Co. , 
PA El. Co. , 
PA Po. & Light Co. , 
PA Po. Co. , 
PECO Energy Co. , 










Blackstone Valley Electric Co. ,* 
Narragansett Electric Co. ,* 
Newport Electric Co. ;* 
Price cap with earnings sharing (see also case 2498/2514 filed in 1996),  
Price cap and rate freeze with earnings sharing,  




SC  Lockhart Power Co. , 




SD  Black Hills Co. ; 
Northwestern Pu. Se. Co. ; 
Rate freeze (see also case EL95-003 filed in 1995), 
None; 
1995-2005 
TN  Kingsport Po. Co. ;  None;   
TX 
Central Po. & Light Co. , 
El Paso El. Co. , 
Entergy Gulf States Inc. , 
Houston Lighting & Po. Co. , 
Southwestern El. Se. Co. , 
Southwestern Pu. Se. Co. , 
TX Utilities Electric Co. ,* 
TX-New Mexico Power Co. ,*  


















VT  Central VT Pu. Se. Co. , 




VA  Appalachian Po. Co. , 




WA  Puget Sound Energy 




WV  Monongahela Po. Co. , 





Consolidated Water Po. Co. , 
Madison Gas & El. Co. ,  
Northern States Po. Co. , 
Northwestern WI El. Co. , 
Pioneer Po. & Light Co. , 
South Beloit Water Gas & El. Co. , 
Superior Water Light & Po. Co. , 
WI El. Po. Co. , 
WI Po. & Light Co. , 












Notes:  1. El., Inc., Po., Pu., Se. are for respectively Company, Electric, Incorporation, Power, Public, Service; 
             2. IOUs included in the EEI report show the * index; 
             3. Relevant PUC’s docket in parentheses. 










               Table 3: Determinants of Incentive Schemes - RE Logit Estimates.  
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Dependent Var.:  PBR  PBR  PBR_F  PBR_F 
































































































  1.064 
(0.346)*** 
Rkhr      2.298 
(0.524)*** 
 
Gen_Nucl  - 14.211 
(6.277)** 
     

























































N. of Obs.                    1372  882  2574  2515 
Log Likelihood  - 58.469  - 45.212  - 106.497  - 35.795 
Notes:  1.  Standard errors in parentheses; 
             2. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%; 
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Table 4: Results on Pass-Through - Fixed Time/State Effects Estimates. 
  (1)  (2)  (3) 
Dependent Var.:  Rkhr  Rkhc  Rkhi 






































Other  Controls  Budgetst  , Employst  , Resst  , Indst  , Youngst  , Gen_Fuelst  , 
Gen_Nuclst  , Popst  , (Popst)
2 , Incomest  , (Incomest)
2 , Salesst .
 
Estimation  Fixed time and state effects (within) estimator. 
N. of Obs.  1372  1372  1372 
R
2  0.89  0.87  0.85 
Notes:  1. Standard errors in parentheses;      





Table 5: Results on Pass-Through - Arellano-Bond Estimates. 
  (1)  (2)  (3) 
Dependent Var.:  Rkhr  Rkhc  Rkhi 












Other  Controls  Constantst ,Dependent Var.(-1)st  , Reg_Elecst  , Jud_Elecst , 
Jud_Elecst .cst  , cst  , Budgetst  , Employst  , Resst  , Indst  , Youngst  , 
Gen_Fuelst  , Gen_Nuclst  , Popst  , (Popst)





Av_Majst ,Av_Majst*Repst , Repst  . 
Estimation  Arellano-Bond estimator for dynamic panel. 
Ov-Id Test (P-Value)  0.98  0.99  0.99 
N. of Obs.  1274  1274  1274 
Notes:  1. Robust standard errors in parentheses;      
            2. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%; 
            3. One-step results employed for inference on coefficients. 
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